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ABSTRACT 
Title:  The use of accounts in the four major Swedish banks’ accounting 
narratives – an impression management tool used as a response to negative 
media attention? 
Seminar date:   2014-06-02 
Course:   BUSN69 - Degree Project in Accounting and Auditing 
Authors:   Johan Axelsson, Henrik Leufstedt 
Advisors:   Karin Jonnergård, Anne Loft 
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Purpose:   The purpose of this thesis has been to examine whether accounts have 
been given by the four major Swedish banks - Swedbank, Handelsbanken, 
Nordea and SEB - in their accounting narratives as a response to negative 
media attention in the time period 2009 to 2014, and whether those 
accounts could be seen as an impression management tool. 
Methodology:   We have carried out a qualitative study on articles published in Swedish 
web-based media in the time period 2009 to 2014. We have also carried 
out a qualitative content analysis of the four major Swedish banks’ 
accounting narratives to identify accounts in the same time period. 
Theoretical perspective:  The theoretical framework of this study is based on theories on media as a 
powerful stakeholder, Legitimacy theory, Impression Management and 
Accounts. 
Empirical foundation:  The empirical data includes 139 web-based articles published by six 
different Swedish media actors in the time period 2009 to 2014. Those 
articles express criticism raised against the four major Swedish banks’ 
mortgage margins, dividends, reduced manual cash handling and high 
levels of remuneration. The empirical data also includes 27 accounts 
identified in the four major Swedish banks’ accounting narratives in the 
same time period related to the banks’ mortgage margins, dividends, 
reduced manual cash handling and high levels of remuneration. We have 
studied accounting narratives in corporate annual reports, interim reports, 
sustainability reports and press releases. 
Conclusion:   We have been able to demonstrate that accounts have been given by the 
four major Swedish banks in their accounting narratives to respond to 
negative media attention in the time period 2009 to 2014. In Swedbank, 
we have been able to prove a definite connection between some identified 
accounts and media attention, and further have found indications that other 
identified accounts in the other three banks likely are related to negative 
media attention as well. Overall, Swedbank is highly overrepresented in 
number of accounts. Most of the identified accounts have been 
justification accounts. Our findings show that accounts could be seen as an 
impression management tool the banks can use to handle negative media 
attention, having the ability to affect accounting narrative readers’ 
perceptions and neutralize a negative picture given by media.  This is one 
possible way for the banks to reduce or close potential legitimacy gaps 
arisen due to negative media attention. Further, our findings indicate that 
media is a powerful stakeholder important for the banks to be able to 
manage. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Research background 
“We communicate the reality: that is the myth; that is what people believe. And, in a sense, 
we do communicate reality. There is something there: bricks and people and so on. And the 
organization can, say, be ‘doing well’, or doing ‘badly’, in whatever sense you take that to 
mean. And it is our job to convey it. But what is ‘the full picture’? There is no full picture. We 
make the picture. That is what gives us our power: people think and act on the basis of that 
picture! Do you see? Are you beginning to see?” (Hines, 1988: 254) 
In her article, Hines (1988) emphasizes and questions the role of accountants and preparers of 
financial reports. Does a financial report give an objective picture of reality? According to 
Hines (1988), it does not. Further, does a financial report affect readers’ perceptions of 
company-related matters? According to Hines (1988), it does. Thus, besides telling 
shareholders and other stakeholders about company financial performance, and further being 
an important tool to use for management accountability purposes, financial reports are 
something more. They are something that may affect readers’ perceptions and the way those 
readers think about company-related matters. Hence, financial reports can be seen as “tools of 
management, marketing and communication theory [used] to construct a picture of the 
organization” (Stanton & Stanton, 2002: 478), i.e. an active communication tool a company 
uses to tell stories regarding its operations and activities (Hopwood, 1996). In line with Hines’ 
(1988) arguments, there are reasons to believe that those stories cannot be seen as something 
totally neutral and objective.  
Regarding financial reports as a communication tool, researchers have “utilized various tools 
to identify the ways in which parts of the front half of annual reports are used to convey 
particular messages” (Stanton & Stanton, 2002: 485). The front half of the annual report is the 
part which is not consisting of the financial statements. Instead, the front half of the annual 
report to a high extent consists of accounting narratives. Accounting narratives is text, i.e. 
words and sentences, describing company accomplishments, outcomes etc., complementing 
the financial numbers. There are a few accounting narratives that are mandatory for 
companies to include in their financial statements, but most accounting narratives are 
discretionary, i.e. they are disclosed by companies on a voluntary basis. Further, accounting 
narratives are not just text in financial reports - text in other types of company disclosure 
vehicles could as well be seen as accounting narratives, although less attention has been 
drawn to such alternative disclosure vehicles in prior research (Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 
2013: 30). Inspired by Brennan and Merkl-Davies (2013), accounting narratives in this thesis 
is defined as voluntary disclosed text in corporate annual reports, interim reports, 
sustainability reports and press releases. 
Connected to Hines’ (1988) arguments, some researchers have focused on accounting 
narratives’ role as a tool a company’s management may use for impression management 
purposes, i.e. on how accounting narratives may guide “the reader to a particular 
interpretation” regarding certain company-related matters (Stanton & Stanton, 2002: 485, 
inspired by Thomas, 1997). In this thesis, we define impression management as a “conscious 
or unconscious attempt to control images that are projected in real or imagined social 
interaction” (Clow & Kenneth, 2005: 93). In particular, researchers in the field have studied 
and focused on the relationship between a company’s financial performance and what its 
accounting narratives tell about this performance. This prior research shows that accounting 
narratives both can be and are used for impression management purposes.  
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Jones (1996) outlined two main problems regarding accounting narratives – the risk of them 
not being objective, and the risk of them being difficult to read and understand. Adelberg 
(1979) stated that it was easier to read and understand accounting narratives in financially 
well-performing companies’ than in poor-performing ones. Courtis (1995) found that it is 
difficult for the average reader to understand accounting narratives in financial reports, and 
further that managers seem to obfuscate bad news. Clatworthy and Jones (2001) also found 
evidence of the tendency of obfuscating bad news, finding thematic structures in some 
companies’ chairman’s statements that emphasized good news and obfuscated bad news. 
According to Aerts (1994: 337), accounting narratives are “defensive in nature”, i.e. 
companies seldom admit they are wrong. Aerts (2005) also found a tendency that listed 
companies are more defensive in their accounting narratives than non-listed ones. Clatworthy 
and Jones (2006) found evidence of impression management in some chairman’s statements. 
They also found a tendency that profitable companies in their accounting narratives focus 
more on past performance, while unprofitable companies in their accounting narratives focus 
more on the future. Smith and Taffler (1992), as well as Clarke (1997), found that companies 
in their accounting narratives to a higher extent link company success to internal factors, 
while company failure to a higher extent is linked to external factors. The Pollyanna Effect, 
i.e. the tendency that poor-performing companies use positive words conversely to explain 
negative outcome, was observed by Hildebrandt and Snyder (1981). Evidence of the 
Pollyanna Effect was also found by Rutherford (2003: 373), who however also stated that it 
can be discussed how effective impression management strategies are, i.e. whether 
“sophisticated preparers would expect users to respond naively to efforts to manage 
impressions”. 
Thomas (1997) addressed how linguistic structures in accounting narratives were used by 
companies to blur attention in years of poor financial performance. Linguistic structures were 
also examined by Sandell and Svensson (2012). Sandell and Svensson (2012) found that 
companies that had failed to meet analysts’ expectations regarding their financial performance 
gave accounts in accounting narratives in their interim reports, i.e. words and sentences were 
used by those companies in a way that could affect the reader’s perceptions of why the 
companies had failed to meet analysts’ expectations. In this thesis, accounts are defined as 
“linguistic devices employed when an outcome, action or decision is assessed by stakeholders 
of a company” (Sandell and Svensson (2012: 4). 
Accounts, accounting narratives, impression management and disclosure vehicles are all 
central terms in this thesis, and understanding of the relationship between those terms is 
crucial for the understanding of the thesis. Hence, before we continue, the reader must be 
aware of that accounts are linguistic devices that could be used in companies’ accounting 
narratives, affecting readers’ perceptions and thus being a possible impression management 
tool. Accounting narratives can be found in different types of company disclosure vehicles. 
The question whether accounts could be seen as an impression management tool is something 
we will further examine in this thesis. 
1.2 Problem discussion 
It is only mandatory for a company to have accounting narratives related to the financial 
statements audited. However, most accounting narratives - and all accounting narratives we 
intend to examine in this thesis - are discretionary. Such accounting narratives’ content are not 
audited by an external party. This fact makes them something whose objectivity in many ways 
could be questioned, since a company’s management could use such accounting narratives for 
impression management purposes (Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2013). We argue that this is 
something accounting narrative readers may not be aware of, and do not critically reflect upon 
- especially not in reports signed by an auditor. This in turn makes those readers more likely 
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to be affected by impression management techniques. Thus, accounting narrative readers 
might be guided towards a particular interpretation of a situation given by a company without 
realizing it, a problem we intend to address in this thesis. Even though accounting narrative 
readers may be more sceptical towards press releases, and perhaps also towards sustainability 
reports - at least sustainability reports not signed by an auditor - we argue that those readers 
might still be guided towards a particular interpretation in accounting narratives in such 
disclosure vehicles as well. 
Further, to make a reader aware of the possible existence of impression management 
techniques in accounting narratives, we believe it is of importance to also demonstrate 
possible reasons of why the preparer of an accounting narrative would want to affect the 
reader’s perceptions. Regarding this, prior research on accounting narratives has to a high 
extent focused on accounting narratives as a tool companies use to explain poor financial 
performance to their shareholders. However, within this research field, less attention has been 
drawn to the possibility that accounting narratives may also be used by companies to 
neutralize a negative picture given by mass media. Mass media will in this thesis henceforth 
be referred to as media. Media attention has instead been examined in other research fields, 
e.g. within the social and environmental accounting literature (O’Donovan, 2002), where “one 
factor that has been suggested as being particularly influential in creating legitimacy gaps for 
an organisation is the news media” (Islam & Deegan, 2010: 133). Hence, we argue that it 
would be of interest to examine media’s role in the accounting narrative research field. We 
think it is reasonable to believe that companies give accounts in some of their accounting 
narratives to affect the reader’s perceptions regarding a negative picture given by media, and 
not only to explain poor financial performance to their shareholders. We argue that this 
possible link between accounts in accounting narratives and media pressure is of particular 
interest for any reader of an accounting narrative to be aware of, since a reader then would get 
a deeper understanding of why the preparer of an accounting narrative would want to affect 
the reader’s perceptions and possibly engage in impression management techniques. 
1.3 The chosen sector of our research - the four major Swedish banks 
To demonstrate the existence of accounts in accounting narratives, while at the same time 
trying to link such accounts to media attention, we have chosen to examine the four major 
Swedish banks and their accounting narratives. Those banks are Swedbank, Handelsbanken, 
SEB and Nordea (the Riksbank, 2013). The possible existence of impression management in 
banks’ accounting narratives is in itself interesting, we argue, since most people have some 
form of relationship with a bank. Further, there is a specific circumstance making those banks 
suitable for our study. In recent years - our focus will be on the period 2009 to 2014 - those 
banks have been criticized by several of their stakeholders for their mortgage margins, 
dividends, high levels of remuneration and reduced manual cash handling - four categories we 
in this thesis sometimes will refer to as “areas of criticism”. The criticism raised by those 
stakeholders has to a high extent been expressed in Swedish media (e.g. Dagens Industri, 
2012; Svenska Dagbladet, 2011). In a study made by Nord and Shehata (2013), it is stated that 
the four major banks indeed have got a lot of attention in Swedish media after the financial 
crisis in 2008. Those circumstances make the four major Swedish banks suitable for our 
study, since we will be able to use the banks to examine whether their accounting narratives to 
some extent have been used to give accounts regarding the topics media has criticized them 
for, the banks thus perhaps trying to neutralize media’s negative picture. Further, since the 
banks have been financially well-performing in the selected period, our focus differ from 
much prior research on accounting narratives, where focus to a high extent has been on 
accounts in poor-performing companies. 
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We want to emphasize that the question whether the criticism directed against the banks is 
justified or not is complex. On one hand, media could be seen as an objective actor reducing 
information asymmetry between two actors - in our research context the banks and the readers 
of those banks’ accounting narratives (Graber, 2003). On the other hand, media could also be 
seen as an actor more interested in selling scandalizing stories than being objective and telling 
the truth (Blumler & Kavanagh, 1999). Hence, it is hard to determine whether the criticism 
targeted against the banks is justified or not, since there may be arguments for both points of 
view. However, the focus in this thesis is not on whether the banks’ behaviour is appropriate 
or not.  
1.4 Purpose of the thesis 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine whether accounts have been given by the four major 
Swedish banks - Swedbank, Handelsbanken, Nordea and SEB - in their accounting narratives 
as a response to negative media attention in the time period 2009 to 2014, and whether those 
accounts could be seen as an impression management tool. 
1.5 Research questions 
To be able to give an answer to the purpose of the thesis, we will use the two following 
research questions: 
1. What concerns has been expressed in Swedish media in the time period 2009 to 2014 
regarding the four major Swedish banks’ way of handling mortgage margins, dividends, high 
levels of remuneration and reduced manual cash handling? 
2. Are accounts given in the four major Swedish banks’ accounting narratives as a response to 
this criticism? 
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Media as a powerful stakeholder 
“Which groups are stakeholders deserving or requiring management attention”? (Mitchell et 
al., 1997: 855). This question is of importance, since there are certain types of stakeholders’ 
which companies are more likely to take into account and respond to. Responses to certain 
stakeholders is a sign of that those stakeholders are powerful, and that they in one or another 
way are vital for a company to stay as a going concern (Deegan, 2013). Thus, a company’s 
management will try to identify such important stakeholders to which they have to respond 
(Woodward & Woodward, 2001). Hybels (1995: 243-244) identified four types of company 
stakeholders that are critical for a company’s “establishment, growth, and survival”. The 
stakeholder groups he identified were the state, the public - which he defined as “consumer 
groups and other “public interest” groups” - the financial community and media. Although 
media has no resources a company is in need of, it is according to Hybels (1995) a particular 
powerful stakeholder. What makes media powerful is the fact that media influences other 
powerful stakeholders in their decisions. Further, media is a communication channel other 
stakeholders can use to express their opinion. Those facts can be connected to the four major 
Swedish banks. It is likely that the banks are affected by media reporting and have to take 
media reporting into consideration, since media is an important source of information of 
which other important stakeholders of the banks might take impression when making 
decisions. Further, media is a communication channel where dissatisfied bank stakeholders 
has the ability to express their opinion. 
Although not much attention has been drawn to media in the research context of accounting 
narratives and accounts, research has been conducted in many other different types of 
research fields, where media’s role as a powerful actor in society has been demonstrated. We 
argue this prior research on media’s power will demonstrate that it is likely that accounts 
identified in the banks’ accounting narratives regarding topics media has been reporting about 
is a response to this criticism, even in accounting narratives where the banks do not mention 
media’s role explicitly. 
2.1.1 Prior research on media as a powerful stakeholder 
Media is a powerful actor since it has the ability to shape public opinion regarding what topics 
the public considers as important (McCombs & Shaw, 1972), and due to the fact that it can 
reach so many people with its information (Nanz & Steffek, 2004: 333). A company given 
more attention in media also gets more public attention (Bansal & Clelland, 2004). It is to a 
high extent through media people learn about the world (Luhmann, 2000), since “media 
provide[s] contact with social reality and give[s] people access particularly to those events 
which they cannot watch with their own eyes” (Schulz, 2004: 91). A picture given by media 
thus becomes a crucial source of information for people, since media “covers complex topics 
that do not allow for direct impressions within an individuals surrounding” and hence in such 
situations becomes “the most important source of information” for people (Brettschneider, 
2002: 252). Negative media reporting may cause companies harm (Phillips, 2003). 
Ader (1995) studied media’s role in shaping public opinion. His conclusion was that media 
reporting determines what topics the public believes to be important. Especially when it 
comes to companies of larger size, media plays an important role as a public information 
provider. Thus, such companies get more media attention, which in turn increase the risk of 
them being negatively affected if the media attention is negative (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990). 
Further, media is also not just an actor affecting a company as a whole - media also affects 
company executives specifically, e.g. the CEO. Media could be seen as a watchdog, reducing 
CEOs flexibility. If a CEO does something inappropriate and media decides to report on it, 
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this can damage the CEOs reputation. Hence, managing media relationships is important for 
executives not just for the company’s sake, but for their own sake as well (Hamilton & 
Zeckhauser, 2004). All those facts make it likely that negative attention in media affects the 
four major Swedish banks and may cause them harm, and gives a likely explanation to why 
they would find it necessary to respond to media attention, e.g. by giving accounts. We do not 
claim that media is the only source of information. However, it is likely that the banks’ 
stakeholders are affected by media reporting, and that they might adopt media’s point of view.  
Further, of particular interest for our study is that Nord and Shehata (2013) state that Swedish 
banks in their role as important intermediaries in society has attracted people’s attention in 
times of crisis - e.g. during the financial crisis 2008 – and that media plays an important role 
in giving the banks this attention, since media is a dominant information channel in society. 
Hence, Nord and Shehata (2013) confirm that media has given the banks attention in the time 
period 2009 to 2014, and that the banks are affected by this attention. The fact that banks get 
this attention in particular could also be explained by Meznar and Nigh’s (1995: 980) 
statement that “actors in the general environment are likely to take a greater interest in 
organizations that directly affect them, or at least in organizations of which they are aware 
of”, which banks can be claimed to be since almost all people have some form of relationship 
with a bank. 
Some research within CSR and sustainability has shown that media attention could lead to an 
increased amount of voluntary disclosures in companies. Brown and Deegan (1998) examined 
and found evidence of that an increased level of media attention seems to lead to an increased 
level of voluntary disclosures. This could be connected to our research, since we are searching 
for voluntary accounting narratives connected to the topics the banks have been criticized for. 
If we find such voluntary disclosures, it is hence likely that media is at least partly a reason of 
their existence. Further, Deegan et al. (2004) studied a company’s voluntary disclosures 
during a certain period of time. They found that the company gave voluntary disclosures 
regarding the same topics that media recently had been reporting about. Although this 
company was not specifically the target of criticism as is the case with the four major Swedish 
banks, those findings is still of interest to our study, since they make it likely that if accounts 
are identified in the banks’ accounting narratives, it is likely that media is at least partly a 
reason of their existence. 
In this thesis, we intend to examine whether criticism in media leads to a situation where the 
examined banks respond to this criticism by giving accounts in some of their accounting 
narratives. Thus, we have made an assumption that the examined banks are forced to react on 
external pressure from e.g. media to maintain legitimacy - otherwise, no discretionary 
accounting narratives responding to the criticism could be expected to be found in any of the 
banks’ disclosure vehicles. Prior research has shown that media indeed is an important source 
of company legitimacy (Ruef & Scott, 1998), and that negative media attention can damage 
this legitimacy (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Hybels, 1995; Johnson & Holub, 2003; Palazzo & 
Scherer, 2006). Media’s ability to draw attention to a certain actor makes those actors 
exposed. Such exposure can both give companies legitimacy, as well as making them lose it, 
depending on whether the picture given by media is positive or negative (Pollock & Rindova, 
2003). Explained differently, media reporting affects people’s perceptions regarding whether 
a company should be seen as legitimate - that is the reason why media is an actor companies 
must be able to manage (Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001). All those findings show that media is an 
important source of legitimacy - that is what makes media an important and powerful 
stakeholder. Hence, to further deepen the reader’s understanding of legitimacy, we will now 
continue with describing legitimacy on a more general level. 
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2.2 Legitimacy theory 
Legitimacy theory is a theory that on a general level can explain what the four major Swedish 
banks may want to achieve by giving accounts in non-mandatory accounting narratives. In 
Legitimacy theory, focus is not on the relationship between legitimacy and a certain 
stakeholder, but rather on the relationship between legitimacy and society at large (Deegan, 
2013).  
Legitimacy is “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are 
desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, 
beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995: 574). Legitimacy theory has been developed and 
used by researchers to try to explain why companies choose to make voluntary disclosures, 
especially within CSR and sustainability research (Deegan, 2013). According to Dowling and 
Pfeffer (1975: 122), companies’ quest for legitimacy can be explained by the fact that 
“organizations seek to establish congruence between the social values associated with or 
implied by their activities and the norms of acceptable behaviour in the larger social system of 
which they are a part”, since they consider it to be of major importance to be seen as 
legitimate actors in society. To maintain legitimacy, a company’s actions must be congruent 
with society’s expectations (Deegan, 2013). If a company loses legitimacy, there is a major 
risk it will lose shareholders and customers (Deegan, 2002). Thus, a company can take 
damage if not perceived as a legitimate actor, since that may affect both the company’s 
profitability and its reputation (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975). Connecting those facts to our own 
research context, it is reasonable to believe that it is important for the four major Swedish 
banks to be seen as legitimate actors in society. If the banks are criticized for their behaviour 
in one or several ways, their reputation is threatened, as well as their business’ profitability. 
Thus, their business can take damage if they just ignore the criticism. Hence, it is reasonable 
to believe that the banks have to respond to the criticism targeted against them in media, e.g. 
by giving accounts in some of their accounting narratives. 
Discrepancy between a company’s behaviour and society’s expectations creates a legitimacy 
gap. A legitimacy gap can occur in different ways. A gap can occur when a company changes 
organizational behaviour regarding a certain matter, i.e. when a company handles something 
in a new manner, not in line with public expectations (Deegan, 2013). A gap can also occur 
when society becomes aware of organizational behaviour regarding a certain matter it was not 
aware of before, i.e. the company has secretly acted contrary to public expectations regarding 
a certain matter (Sethi, 1977). Further, a gap can occur when society norms are changed 
regarding a certain matter, i.e. something has made society to think in a new different way 
regarding this certain matter (Sethi, 1978). This last-mentioned reason for a legitimacy gap 
highlights something important – what is seen as legitimate behaviour is dynamic, and 
changes over time. Legitimate behaviour depends on public norms, something that can change 
quickly (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975: 126). Thus, obeying laws does not automatically make a 
company legitimate. Changing laws is a slow-moving process, while public norms as stated 
can change quickly (Deegan, 2013). Those facts regarding legitimacy gaps can help us to 
demonstrate that if we find discretionary accounting narratives in the examined banks 
connected to criticism raised in media, there are reasons to believe that some type of 
legitimacy gap has arisen due to the banks actions and behaviour, i.e. media reporting has 
made people think the banks behaviour is not appropriate. Further, it is likely that media and 
media reporting have played a role in creating this legitimacy gap. 
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If a legitimacy gap has arisen, a company will try to close or reduce it. There are different 
strategies a company can use to do this. Dowling and Pfeffer (1975) outlined four such 
different strategies (citations made by van der Laan, 2009: 20, inspired by Dowling & Pfeffer, 
1975): 
 
1) a company can “change its output, methods or goals to conform with the expectations of it 
relevant publics, and then inform these relevant publics of the change” 
2) a company can “not change its output, methods or goals, but demonstrate the 
appropriateness of its output, methods or goals through education and information” 
3) a company can “try to alter the perceptions of relevant publics by associating itself with 
symbols that have a high legitimate status” 
4) a company can “try to alter societal expectations by aligning them with the organisation’s 
output, goals or methods” 
Those strategies to close legitimacy gaps demonstrate something important - a company can 
choose to change behaviour if criticized. However, that is not the only way to close a 
legitimacy gap. A company can also try to affect and change people’s perceptions. A matter 
of fact, Lindblom (1993) states that it is ultimately society’s perceptions of a company’s 
actions and behaviour that will determine whether the company is seen as legitimate, and not 
the company’s actual actions and behaviour. Those insights could be connected to the 
possible use of impression management in the four major Swedish banks, we argue, since the 
banks thus can be expected to use accounts in their accounting narratives to change people’s 
perceptions, enabling them to perhaps close a potential legitimacy gap created by media 
without having to change actual behaviour.  
2.3 Impression management - an introduction 
Impression management has already been introduced in this thesis’ introductory chapter, 
where impression management was defined as a “conscious or unconscious attempt to control 
images that are projected in real or imagined social interaction” (Clow & Kenneth, 2005: 93). 
Impression management can be used by companies to guide “the reader to a particular 
interpretation” regarding certain company-related matters (Stanton & Stanton, 2002: 485, 
inspired by Thomas, 1997), where focus in this thesis is on this phenomena in accounting 
narratives. Since impression management is a central term in the thesis, a more 
comprehensive description is needed, we argue.  
Impression management was originally a term within psychology research, where impression 
management was defined as “the tendency to protect one’s self-image”, i.e. a process where 
individuals attempt to control other peoples’ impressions of them (Clow & Kenneth, 2005: 
93). Impression management is the study of how “individuals present themselves to others to 
be perceived favourably by others” (Hooghiemstra, 2000: 60), i.e. an image-protecting 
strategy. To be able to maintain or improve a desirable image, an individual will try to create 
an image that as much as possible is associated with positive characteristics, and as little as 
possible with negative characteristics (Clow & Kenneth, 2005: 93). This could be highlighted 
with an example. If person number 1 has a negative impression regarding a story or event 
connected to person number 2, impression management is a technique for person number 2 to 
respond to this by trying to affect person number 1’s perceptions of that negative story or 
event, person number 2 thus trying to create a more favourable image of the story or event in 
person number 1’s mind.  
Research regarding impression management is comprehensive (Brennan et al., 2013). Since 
the focus in this thesis lies on impression management in the corporate context - more 
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specifically in accounting narratives - a more comprehensive presentation in this context will 
be made below.  
2.3.1 Impression Management in accounting narratives 
Impression management is one possible strategy for a company to use to when trying to 
restore or maintain legitimacy, and thus a strategy a company can use to manage stakeholder 
relations. Impression management in the corporate context is present when executives in a 
selective manner choose what information to disclose to their shareholders and stakeholders, 
and when they present such information in a way that may distort the reader’s perception, 
possibly affecting that reader’s opinion regarding a certain company-related matter. 
Management disclosing more positive and less negative information in their accounting 
narratives is another way to manipulate the reader’s perception (Merkl-Davies et al., 2011). 
Thus, such disclosures can help companies to get support for their behaviour, and can be used 
to distract stakeholders whom do not think a certain behaviour is appropriate. This is e.g. 
highlighted by Gray et al. (1996: 46), whom state that “information […] is a major element 
that can be employed by the organisation to manage (or manipulate) the stakeholder in order 
to gain their support and approval, or to distract their opposition or disapproval”. In line with 
Clow and Kenneth (2005: 93), using disclosures for impression management purposes can 
both be a conscious or unconscious strategy used by the executives. Nonetheless, if the 
strategy succeeds, it may undermine the quality of financial reporting, and further may lead to 
a situation where a company gets unjustifiable support from non-financial stakeholders and 
society at large (Brennan et al., 2009).  
The type of impression management we focus on in this thesis is how accounting narratives -
  i.e. text, words and sentences - in company disclosure vehicles can be used to affect readers’ 
perceptions. Accounting narratives can be found in annual reports, but also in other company 
disclosure vehicles. As mentioned, in this thesis we have also included interim reports, press 
releases and sustainability reports. Accounting narratives do not have to be audited, except 
from the notes in the financial statements. This fact makes them a possible impression 
management tool, since no third party has to approve their content. Instead, as stated by 
Brennan et al. (2013: 1) - “at best, other narrative accounting disclosures are merely 
monitored by external auditors for consistency with the financial statements”. Hence, it is 
easier for managers to manipulate such information, making accounting narratives a tool that 
may be used for impression management purposes.  
Using linguistic structures - i.e. using words and sentences in a certain way - is one strategy a 
company can use to affect the reader’s perceptions regarding a certain act or event. Thomas 
(1997) addressed how linguistic structures in accounting narratives were used by companies 
to blur attention in years of poor financial performance. The type of linguistic structures we 
will focus on in this thesis is accounts, which e.g. have been studied in the corporate context 
by Sandell and Svensson (2012).  
2.4 Accounts  
In this thesis, we focus on the possible existence of accounts in the four major Swedish banks’ 
accounting narratives. Thus, what we specifically focus on is how words and sentences - i.e. 
text - in those banks’ accounting narratives might affect the reader’s perceptions regarding 
topics the banks have been criticized for in media. Theory on accounts can describe how 
words and sentences in written text can affect readers’ perceptions - in our research context 
accounting narrative readers. 
An account was originally defined as “a linguistic device employed [by a party] whenever an 
action is subjected to valuative inquiry” by one or several other parties to “prevent conflicts 
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from arising by bridging the gap between action and expectation” (Scott & Lyman (1968: 46). 
Accounts can both be used by companies proactively - i.e. if one party believes there is a risk 
it will be criticized by another party for something - as well as reactively - i.e. if one party 
already has been criticized by another party (Orbuch, 1997).  
Taking accounts into the accounting narrative context, Sandell and Svensson (2012: 4) state 
that accounts are “linguistic devices employed when an outcome, action or decision is 
assessed by stakeholders of a company”, which is the definition we use in this thesis. 
Explained differently, accounts are words and sentences formulated in a certain way, which 
could affect a narrative reader’s perceptions, thus guiding the reader “to a particular 
interpretation” regarding a specific topic in line with Stanton & Stanton (2002: 485), inspired 
by Thomas (1997).  If used successfully, a given account has the ability to close an arisen gap 
between the criticized party’s action and the criticizing party’s expectation, i.e. a given 
account might lead to an accounting narrative reader adopting the criticized party’s 
opinion (Scott & Lyman, 1968). Hence, accounts could be seen as an impression management 
tool, we argue, since impression management is a “conscious or unconscious attempt to 
control images that are projected in real or imagined social interactions” (Clow & Kenneth, 
2005: 93). This is something we will try to demonstrate in this thesis. 
Theory on accounts have been used and developed by researchers in different research fields 
(e.g., McLaughlin, O’Hair & Cody, 1983; Sandell & Svensson, 2012; Schönbach, 1980; Scott 
& Lyman, 1968). Out of those researchers, Sandell and Svensson (2012) examined accounts 
in the accounting narrative context. In their research, Sandell and Svensson (2012) 
demonstrated the existence of accounts in some examined companies’ interim reports. Those 
were companies that had failed to meet analysts’ financial expectations. Sandell and Svensson 
(2012) demonstrated how words and sentences were used by some of those companies in a 
way that could affect the interim report readers, thus perhaps making those readers adopting 
the company’s view on why the company had failed to meet analysts’ expectations. Those 
findings are useful for us in our research, since we can conduct our study in a similar way, 
searching for accounts regarding topics the four major Swedish banks have been criticized for 
in media. 
To be able to identify accounts in the examined banks, we need to clarify the characteristics of 
the different types of accounts. In total, seven types of accounts have been identified by 
researchers (McLaughlin et al., 1983; Schönbach, 1980; Sandell & Svensson, 2012; Scott & 
Lyman, 1968). However, there is no complete consensus among researchers whether some 
types of accounts represent an own group of accounts, or if they are a subpart of other groups 
(Sandell & Svensson, 2012). According to us, the most distinct way to distinguish the 
different types of accounts from each other is made by Sandell and Svensson (2012). Hence, 
we will use the same categorization as they do. Thus, the different types of accounts the banks 
may use in their accounting narratives are as follows: 
Excuse - An excuse is an account where the criticized party admits to the reader that an 
act/event is negative and/or inappropriate. However, the criticized party does not admit being 
responsible for the act/event, at least not to a full extent. Instead, the criticized party blames 
external circumstances it has no control over, e.g. accidents or actions made by other external 
parties (Lyman & Scott, 1968). 
Justification – A justification is an account where the criticized party does not admit to the 
reader that the act/event is negative and inappropriate, trying to demonstrate the act/events’ 
positive consequences. It can also be an account where the criticized party realizes that the 
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act/event may not be seen as appropriate, but where its standpoint is that the act/event is of 
little importance (Scott & Lyman, 1968). 
Concession – A concession is an account where the criticized party explicitly admits to the 
reader the act/event being negative, making clear to the reader that it is aware of that it has not 
handled in an appropriate manner. Thus, the criticized party takes full responsibility for the 
consequences of its actions (Schönbach, 1980). 
Refusal – A refusal is an account where the criticized party does not admit to the reader that 
the act/event has taken place. Thus, it completely denies to the reader the existence of the 
act/event  (Schönbach, 1980). 
Mystification – A mystification account is where the criticized party’s opinion regarding an 
act/event is not clear to the reader. The criticized party uses words and sentences in a blurry 
way that makes it hard or even impossible for the reader to understand the criticized party’s 
opinion regarding the act/event (Sandell & Svensson, 2012). 
Refocusing – A refocusing account is an account where the criticized party tries to guide the 
reader away from the act/event it has been criticized for, not giving the reader its opinion 
regarding that certain event. Instead, the criticized party in the same sentence or at least 
adjacent to the negative act/event tries to guide the reader’s attention towards another, more 
positive topic related to the company (Schönbach, 1980; Scott & Lyman, 1968). 
Silence – A silence account is an account where the criticized party does not mention a 
negative act/event at all. The criticized party does not mention the negative act/event since it 
believes that will make the situation worse. This way of handling the situation can be seen as 
an implicit admittance of guilt (McLaughlin et al., 1983). Due to the fact that a silence 
account is not about words and sentences, this is a type of account we will not study in our 
research context  
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3. RESEARCH METHOD 
3.1 How we have carried out our study 
The purpose of this thesis has been to examine whether accounts have been given by the four 
major Swedish banks - Swedbank, Handelsbanken, Nordea and SEB - in their accounting 
narratives as a response to negative media attention in the time period 2009 to 2014, and 
whether those accounts could be seen as an impression management tool. 
To give an answer to the purpose of the thesis, we have used the two following research 
questions: 
1. What concerns has been expressed in the Swedish media during the period between 2009 
and 2014 regarding the four major Swedish banks’ way of handling mortgage margins, 
dividends, high levels of remuneration and reduced manual cash handling? 
2. Do accounts exist in the four major Swedish banks accounting narratives as a response to 
this criticism? 
To be able to give an answer to our purpose, we have carried out a qualitative study, which 
we argue is in line with both our research questions. We found it necessary to conduct a 
qualitative analysis on articles in Swedish media to be able to present how media has reported 
regarding the areas of criticism. Further, we needed to interpret the examined banks’ 
accounting narratives to be able to determine whether we could find accounts in those 
accounting narratives. Thus, a quantitative study would have been to no use. 
3.2 Step A - Selecting relevant theory 
The first step in our study has been to collect relevant theory derived from prior research in 
our research field. Our intention with presenting and using those theories has been to deepen 
the reader’s understanding of our selected research field, as well as to place our research in a 
larger research context. Further, this theory will add relevance to our analysis and 
conclusions, we argue. The reason of why we have selected those specific theories and 
believe them to be relevant for our thesis has already been motivated in chapter 2. We do not 
claim that there are no other theories and authors that could not have been used as well. 
However, we are convinced we have selected appropriate theory developed by relevant 
researchers, since we have only selected theory from established researchers. To be certain 
about this, we have just used articles available at LUB Search and/or Google Scholar. In the 
few cases where we have referred to books or articles not yet available at LUB Search and 
Google Scholar, we have made research regarding those authors, where the way of confirming 
their relevance has been to examine whether those authors have other published articles 
available at LUB Search and/or Google Scholar, and/or that they are connected to established 
research institutions. 
3.2.1 Definitions 
In this thesis, we have defined terms as accounts, accounting narratives and impression 
management in a certain way. It should be stated that the definitions we have selected are not 
the only ones that exist. However, we had to make a decision - after all, researchers interpret 
things in different ways - and since the definitions we use are developed by established 
researchers, we claim that they are appropriate. Further, there are no major differences 
between our chosen definitions and other definitions - thus, other definitions would not have 
affected our thesis’ findings in any significant way. However, one thing a reader could argue 
about is the fact that in our definition of impression management, it is stated that impression 
management could both be a conscious as well as an unconscious attempt to control people’s 
perceptions. Some researchers would probably disagree with this definition, claiming that 
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impression management is a cynical, deliberate strategy. However, we cannot claim that it is 
for sure that the banks have chosen to use accounts - which we in this thesis will try to 
demonstrate could be an impression management tool - deliberately to affect readers’ 
perceptions, even though it is likely that they actually have in some cases. Further, we want to 
emphasize that we do not claim that is a questionable way of acting by the banks if trying to 
affect readers’ perceptions and convince the readers that the banks’ opinions are the correct 
ones. That is what people in general normally do. We just want to make the reader aware of 
that this is just the banks’ own opinions, and not something that necessarily is true just 
because those opinions are presented in a disclosure vehicle signed by an auditor. 
Another definition of importance for this thesis is the definition of media. In this thesis’, we 
have written about media and media attention as if media is one single actor. In reality, media 
consist of many different types of actors and communication channels, e.g. TV, radio, 
newspapers, web-based newspapers etc. Even though we have not included all those types of 
media actors in our research when collecting our empirical data, the theory on media as a 
powerful stakeholder includes our selected media actors. Thus, those selected actors are a 
sample of a population. This sample is enough for us to draw conclusions, we argue, which 
will be further motivated in Step B. Thus, talking about media as one single actor in the 
theoretical framework and when talking about media attention has been appropriate, we 
argue.  
3.3 Step B - Collecting empirical data 
The second step in our study has been to collect empirical data. The empirics we have 
collected consist of two different kinds of data. 
The first type of empirical data we have collected are web-based articles in Swedish media 
reporting on the four major Swedish banks and their mortgage margins, dividends, high levels 
of remuneration and reduced manual cash handling – we once again want to emphasize that 
we sometimes name those categories “areas of criticism”. The second type of empirical data 
we have collected are accounts given in the four major Swedish banks’ accounting narratives 
in the banks’ annual reports, interim reports, sustainability reports and press releases 
connected to the major Swedish banks and their mortgage margins, dividends, high levels of 
remuneration and reduced manual cash handling. We have collected empirical data in the 
period 2009 to 2014. We have found both types of empirical data necessary to examine 
whether there is a relationship between accounts and media reporting, i.e. whether there is a 
link between identified accounts in the banks’ accounting narratives and the areas of criticism 
media has been reporting about, indicating that those accounts are a response to a negative 
picture given by media. All empirical data we have collected are primary data, which make it 
reliable (May, 2002). 
More specifically, the web-based articles in Swedish media have been used in our analysis to 
demonstrate what concerns that have been expressed in Swedish media during the period 
2009 to 2014 regarding the four major Swedish banks’ way of handling the areas of criticism. 
We have read through the collected articles and then demonstrated some of the concerns 
raised regarding the areas of criticism. We have also presented how many articles we have 
found regarding each area of criticism in the period 2009 to 2014. We have done this to then 
be able to connect identified accounts in the banks’ accounting narratives to media reporting. 
Even though a huge  number of articles in major Swedish media actors’ reporting does not 
prove that identified accounts are connected to this reporting - unless media’s role in them is 
mentioned explicitly - we argue it makes it more likely. It should be mentioned that we in our 
empirical data have included articles criticizing not just some or all of the four major Swedish 
banks - we have also included some articles criticizing the Swedish bank sector in general. 
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We believe this to be appropriate since those articles as well target criticism against the four 
major Swedish banks. 
To find relevant web-based articles, we have used Google as a search engine. Using Google 
has enabled us to search for articles year by year. The search words we have used are 
“mortgage margins”, “dividends”, “remuneration”, “reduced manual cash handling”, 
“criticism”, “criticized” and “critique”, although we have used the Swedish words since the 
articles are in Swedish. We have also added a searching word consisting of the respective 
web-based Swedish media actor we have decided to include in our empirical data. Regarding 
this, we decided to include web-based articles from reliable sources as unbiased and reliable 
as possible. Hence, we included Dagens Nyheter (DN), Svenska Dagbladet (SvD), Dagens 
Industri (DI) and Sveriges Television (SVT). However, due to their major size and their 
position as strong opinion influencers in Sweden, we also decided to include Expressen and 
Aftonbladet. We will refer to those six actors as “the media actors”. Those six actors are all 
central Swedish media actors. 
Our intention has been to find at least six articles per area of criticism and selected media 
actor in the period 2009 to 2014, i.e. 24 articles in total per media actor. We have not had the 
intention to find all published articles, since we found it necessary to limit this data collection. 
We believed that 24 articles per media actor, and 36 per area of criticism, was an appropriate 
distinction to make. We had hoped to be able to see and present more exact tendencies 
regarding when media has been reporting more intense on a certain area of criticism in the 
time period 2009 to 2014, e.g. during a certain month or a certain year, since that perhaps 
would have enabled us to see more exact tendencies of when the banks responded to the 
criticism. However, when we collected the data, we realized we would not be able to identify 
such exact tendencies. Hence, the empirical data gives a general picture of the raised criticism 
in the time period 2009 and 2014. Nonetheless, the table still enables us to demonstrate the 
high level of media reporting in the period 2009 to 2014. We realize that there might have 
been shorter periods of time where reporting regarding some area of criticism has been more 
intense. However, we still argue that our empirical data helps to demonstrate that media 
indeed has been reporting about the areas of criticism in the period, which is sufficient for us 
to be able to discern tendencies.  
Regarding the articles, we have also found it necessary to decide how the word negative in the 
term “negative media attention” should be defined. This is due to the fact that we claim that 
the media attention we examine is negative for the banks, since we have made an assumption 
that the banks may give accounts to neutralize the picture given in those articles. Here, we 
needed to use our own judgment when claiming that an article is contributing to a negative 
picture of the banks’ acting. In line with May (2002), a document cannot be read impartially 
or dispassionately. However, we have tried to be as neutral and objective as possible. Hence, 
we are convinced that the articles we have selected indeed are appropriate, since we carefully 
have considered each article’s relevance. 
Regarding accounts given in the four major Swedish banks’ accounting narratives, we have 
collected this empirical data by reading through the banks’ accounting narratives in annual 
reports, interim reports, sustainability reports and press releases. Since this sample is huge, we 
realize it is possible that we have missed some accounts. To reduce the risk of that happening, 
we have used PDF-versions of all types of disclosure vehicles, except press releases. Press 
releases consist of such a little amount of text that we did not find that necessary. We have 
then used those PDF-versions to search for relevant words in the accounting narratives. The 
words we have searched for are “mortgage margins”, “dividends”, “remuneration”, “reduced 
manual cash handling”, “criticism” and “media”. Even if we have not found all existing 
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accounts, we believe the method to be sufficient since the exact number of accounts is not 
necessary for us to be able to give an answer to our thesis’ purpose. Further, the number of 
accounts is not something necessarily proving the relation between media pressure and 
accounting narratives. Rather, we argue that one single account regarding some of the topics 
media has been reporting about could be interesting enough depending on its content. 
However, we want to emphasize that we have tried to find as many accounts as possible. 
When we looked for accounts, we searched for sentences in line with the definition of 
accounts we selected for this thesis, i.e. for “linguistic devices employed when an outcome, 
action or decision is assessed by stakeholders of a company” (Sandell & Svensson (2012: 4). 
Explained differently, we identified such sentences about mortgage margins, dividends, high 
levels of remuneration and reduced manual cash handling where the banks give an account 
regarding why they have acted in a certain way, and whether they find their actions and 
behaviour appropriate. Concerns regarding our interpretation of text, i.e. the accounts, will be 
further presented in section 3.4.1. 
For this thesis, we have chosen to exclude interviews, since we did not believe interviews 
would help us to examine the link between accounts and media attention. Interviews with 
media representatives would not have added anything of relevance to our thesis, we argue, 
since we already have sufficient theory on media’s role as a powerful actor. Interviews with 
bank representatives could be argued to have been of interest. However, such collected data 
would most likely not be objective and unbiased, since it is likely that the banks and their 
representatives would want to be put in as good light as possible. Further, it is not even certain 
whether they at all would publicly talk about strategic considerations. Thus, we are confident 
in our decision to exclude interviews. 
3.3.1 The selected time frame 
We have collected empirical data in the time period 2009 to 2014. The reason why we chose 
this particular period has already been motivated in the introductory chapter - attention has 
been drawn towards the major Swedish banks in this certain time period, which is e.g. 
confirmed by Nord and Shehata (2013). We do not claim that media attention has not been 
drawn towards the four major Swedish banks in other time periods as well. A wider time 
frame, covering a longer period of time, could have enabled us to discern tendencies of the 
banks’ accounting narratives in a longer time perspective. However, that was not something 
necessary for us to do to be able to give an answer to the purpose of our thesis. 
We have decided to exclude the year 2008, since we expected that possibly given accounts in 
the four major Swedish banks’ accounting narratives this year to a high extent would be 
related to the financial crisis in particular, and not to our chosen areas of criticism. We realize 
that much of the criticism targeted against the banks in the period 2009 to 2014 is related to 
the fact that the financial crisis was a failure for the whole financial sector – the four major 
Swedish banks included (Nord & Shehata, 2013). However, we argue that accounting 
narratives and accounts regarding the banks’ behaviour during the financial crisis is a topic 
vast enough for a separate thesis.  
3.3.2 The selected media communication channel  
We have already motivated our choice of the media actors we have selected when collecting 
our empirical data. However, it could be questioned why we just have selected web-based 
articles. We realize that web-based articles are not the only communication channel where 
criticism is directed against the banks. However, we argue that it is one of the more important 
ones. Further, other communication channels – e.g. TV and radio - are more difficult to study, 
and we are convinced that web-based media articles are a relevant and good source of 
information for our study.  
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Another concern is that we have just collected empirical data from Swedish media. This is not 
an illogical choice, since the four banks we study are Swedish. Thus, we have found it 
reasonable to just examine media criticism in Swedish media. We are aware of that the four 
major Swedish banks also operate in some other countries, and thus may be targets of 
criticism in media in those other countries as well. However, we believe criticism in Swedish 
media is sufficient to study, since the banks have such large parts of their business in Sweden.  
3.3.3 The selected bank disclosure vehicles  
For this study, we needed to decide which bank disclosure vehicles we wanted to include 
when collecting empirical data. We found it necessary to just examine disclosure vehicles of 
which’s content the four major Swedish banks have full control. Otherwise, we could not 
have been sure whether the words actually are the banks’ exact words, or if the words have 
been distorted by a third party. Thus, we have decided to not examine statements published in 
media derived from e.g. interviews. We realize such statements are an important 
communication vehicle for companies when they e.g. respond to criticism. However, such 
statements are not about text - instead they are spoken words that in turn are transcribed into 
written text by a third party, i.e. media. Hence, those statements are secondary sources making 
them less reliable (May, 2002). We could not have been sure whether the words actually were 
the banks’ own words. Thus, we believe it was motivated to not include them in our research. 
The disclosure vehicles we have decided to examine are annual reports, interim reports, 
sustainability reports and press releases. All those selected disclosure vehicles are all 
disclosure vehicles of which’s content the banks have full control - those accounting 
narratives are primary sources, since they consist of the exact words and sentences disclosed 
by the banks. Thus, they have not been distorted by a third party, which in turn makes them 
reliable (May, 2002). We found it appropriate to include all those different types of disclosure 
vehicles in our research, since we could not know if and where we could expect to find 
accounting narratives connected to our selected areas of criticism - prior research have not 
been able to give us guidelines regarding this.  
We could have chosen to study the banks’ webpages. However, it is hard or sometimes even 
impossible to determine when something originally was published on a website. Hence, we 
decided to exclude websites in our research, since we would not have known when the 
accounting narratives were originally published. 
There is one type of disclosure vehicle that could be seen as illogical by us to include in our 
research, we argue - the press releases. This is due to the fact that we in this thesis’ problem 
discussion have argued that readers might think of accounting narratives in financial reports 
as if those have been approved by an auditor, although it is the financial statements that are 
audited, and not the narratives in the front half of the report. We have claimed that this is the 
reason of why impression management techniques might be effective tools in such accounting 
narratives. This argumentation does not fit in that well on press releases. Instead, we think it is 
realistic to believe that people are more sceptical towards press releases. However, we have 
chosen to include them in our study, since we argue they are still a disclosure vehicle with the 
ability to affect people’s perceptions. Based on the same arguments, our choice to include 
sustainability reports could as well be questioned, since sustainability reports do not have to 
be audited by a third party as well - although many companies choose to have their 
sustainability reports audited anyway. However, just as the press releases, we still believe that 
accounting narratives in sustainability reports may affect the reader’s perceptions and guide it 
towards a particular interpretation. 
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When collecting empirical data from different disclosure vehicles, we realize that a critical 
reader could argue that it would have been better to just focus on one type of disclosure 
vehicle due to the fact that we have already chosen to include four different banks and four 
areas of criticism. Such a reader might argue that the sample might be too vast, and that it will 
be difficult for us to draw any stringent conclusions if we find e.g. five examples in one type 
of disclosure vehicle, two examples in another type, none in a third type etc. However, our 
focus has not been on which type of disclosure vehicle the four major Swedish banks most 
likely might use when giving accounts, or to what extent accounts in accounting narratives are 
present in the respective type of disclosure vehicle. Instead, our focus has been to demonstrate 
the possible existence of accounts related to the areas of criticism media has been reporting 
about in general.  
3.4 Step C - Analyse and interpretation of data 
The third step in our study has been to analyse and interpret the collected data. This step can 
be divided into four sub-steps: 
1) We have examined to what extent the major Swedish media actors have been reporting 
about the banks’ mortgage margins, dividends, high levels of remuneration and reduced 
manual cash handling. Those findings are presented in table 1 in chapter 4.1. 
2) We have analysed the articles’ content to show what concerns that have been expressed in 
Swedish media during the period between 2009 and 2014 regarding the four major Swedish 
banks’ way of handling mortgage margins, dividends, high levels of remuneration and 
reduced manual cash handling, making it possible to connect their content to identified 
accounts in the banks’ accounting narratives.  
Regarding step 1 and 2, it could be argued by a critical reader whether all articles are directed 
against all banks, or if they to some extent instead are directed against individual banks. 
Regarding this, it should be stated that our empirical data collection shows that the media 
attention directed against the banks have to a large extent been directed to all four banks. 
There might be slight differences in the amount of critique directed against the respective 
bank, even if we have not found much evidence supporting that. Further, some banks are 
mentioned explicitly in some of the articles, while other banks are mentioned explicitly in 
other articles. However, we argue that our collected empirical data shows sufficient evidence 
of that it is possible to generalize and claim that the media reporting regarding the areas of 
criticism include all four major Swedish banks. 
3) We have presented what accounts we have found in the banks’ accounting narratives 
connected to media reporting, as well as our interpretation of those accounts. Our 
interpretation method is further described in section 3.4.1. 
4) We have discussed the relationship between the given accounts and the media attention, 
and connected our findings to relevant theory. This has been done to sum up our empirics and 
analysis, providing a basis for our conclusions. 
3.4.1 Qualitative content analysis and interpretation of text 
When we have searched for accounts in the banks’ accounting narratives, we have searched 
for sentences in line with the definition of accounts we have selected for this thesis, i.e. for 
“linguistic devices employed when an outcome, action or decision is assessed by stakeholders 
of a company” (Sandell & Svensson, 2012: 4). Explained differently, we have tried to identify 
sentences about mortgage margins, dividends, high levels of remuneration and reduced 
manual cash handling where we state that the banks give an account regarding why they have 
acted in a certain way regarding those areas of criticism, and whether they find their actions 
and behaviour appropriate. Since it has been necessary to make our own interpretations to 
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identify those accounts, we have conducted a qualitative content analysis in this step. We 
have read the accounting narratives, interpreted them and have then presented those 
interpretations to the reader of our thesis (May, 2002). 
In line with May (2002), we have divided our content analysis into three steps. First, we have 
made a problem formulation, where we in this thesis believed that accounts were given in 
some of the banks’ accounting narratives as a response to negative media attention, accounts 
that possibly could affect the accounting narrative readers’ perceptions. After that, we have 
tried to identify accounts in the banks’ accounting narratives connected to the media attention. 
We have read through the narratives, and picked out excerpts consisting of text where we 
state the banks in some way give an account regarding mortgage margins, dividends, high 
levels of remuneration or reduced manual cash handling. Finally, we have analysed and 
interpreted those excerpts, trying to determine which type of account it is, and what 
interpretation of a certain situation a reader might make due to that account. 
Using a qualitative content method has given us flexibility, a fact we have seen as an 
advantage. The method has made it possible for us to consider and analyse the ways in which 
the words and sentences in the four major Swedish banks’ accounting narratives were created. 
On the other hand, since we have made own interpretations, this step could be claimed to be 
subjective. What we have interpreted as given accounts might be interpreted differently by 
other people. On the other hand, a document can never be read in a totally impartial way 
(May, 2002). Further, if a critical reader argues that our interpretations are wrong, that reader 
has started to think about how words and sentences are used in accounting narratives. That 
would show that our thesis in this regard has contributed to that reader thinking critically 
regarding accounting narratives, which is one of the intentions with writing this thesis. 
The fact that we have made an assumption that accounts regarding mortgage margins, 
dividends, high levels of remuneration and reduced manual cash handling perhaps could be 
found in the banks’ accounting narratives is something that could make a reader questioning 
the objectivity of the thesis, since we have not read through the accounting narratives without 
preconditions. Instead, we have actively searched for accounts, and finding accounts is 
something making our thesis more interesting. Further, lifting out text from a larger context 
may lead to a situation where the text is interpreted differently than if a reader would have 
read the whole accounting narrative. However, we could not have done this in any other way, 
we argue - interpreting text is in line with May’s argumentation (2002) the only way for us to 
demonstrate the possible existence of accounts in the accounting narratives. When we have 
made our interpretations, we have tried to stay as objective as possible, and we are convinced 
we have not distorted the meaning of the accounts. Instead, being aware of our own 
limitations strengthens the relevance of our interpretations, we argue. Further, we base our 
interpretation of the text on relevant theory on impression management and accounts. 
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4. EMPIRICS AND ANALYSIS 
The disposition of our empirics and analysis is as follows: 
First, we present to what extent the major Swedish media actors we selected have been 
reporting about the banks’ mortgage margins, dividends, reduced manual cash handling and 
high levels of remuneration in the period 2009 to 2014. Those findings are presented in a 
table, where we comment on our findings. 
Second, we present the accounts we have found regarding each area of criticism. Each area of 
criticism begins with at presentation of the concerns raised in the articles regarding the 
specific area of criticism. The presentation is a summary of the content of the articles we have 
included in our empirical data. Under each area of criticism, we present what accounts we 
have found in which banks’ accounting narratives, and in which type of disclosure vehicle we 
have found them. If a certain bank is not represented regarding a certain area of criticism, that 
means we have not identified any accounts in the bank connected to that area of criticism. 
After each presented account, we conduct an analysis where we use theory on accounts to 
determine what type of account we have identified, and present our impressions regarding the 
accounts. 
Third, we sum up our findings and conduct a final analysis where we connect the identified 
accounts to the media attention, discuss whether the identified accounts could be stated to be a 
type of impression management, and finally link the thesis’ different parts together. 
4.1 The extent of media reporting 
Below, we present to what extent the major Swedish media actors we have collected empirical 
data from - i.e. Dagens Nyheter (DN), Svenska Dagbladet (SvD), Dagens Industri (DI), 
Sveriges Television (SVT), Expressen and Aftonbladet - have been reporting about the four 
major Swedish banks’ way of handling mortgage margins, dividends, reduced manual cash 
handling and high levels of remuneration in the time period 2009 to 2014. This empirical data 
should be considered as a general picture of the raised criticism in the time period 2009 to 
2014. References to those 139 articles are not given here due to their large scope. They are 
provided by the authors of this thesis and can be obtained upon request. 
 
 
Table 1 – The extent of media reporting 
Our intention has been to find 6 articles per actor and selected area of criticism in the time 
period 2009 to 2014, i.e. in total 36 articles per area of criticism. In the table, we can see that 
we have found 36 articles per area of criticism, except regarding reduced manual cash 
handling, where we have found 31 articles. We just found 3 articles regarding that area of 
criticism in Dagens Industri, and 4 articles in Aftonbladet. However, we do not believe that 
this will affect our conclusions in any significant way. Further, some of the articles included 
more than one area of criticism, which in turn made them fit into more than one category. In 
total, we have found 139 articles. Even though our intention was to find 144 articles, we 
believe us to have found sufficient evidence to state that there indeed has been a significant 
amount of criticism directed against the four major Swedish banks in Swedish media in the 
time period 2009 to 2014 regarding the selected areas of criticism. 
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In the articles, the criticism directed against the banks is to a high extent very general. The 
articles often refer to the four major Swedish banks as a group. Naturally, in some of the 
articles just one or a few banks are mentioned. However, overall we state the criticism to be 
quite general, thus including all the four major Swedish banks - there is no bank that has been 
much more criticized than any other. However, something we have noticed is that 
Handelsbanken seldom is explicitly mentioned by name in the articles. Rather, 
Handelsbanken is more often included just when the articles refer to “the four major Swedish 
banks”. Further, regarding reduced manual cash handling, we have seen some tendencies that 
Swedbank and Nordea have been slightly more criticized regarding this area of criticism. 
4.2 Accounts - mortgage margins 
The four major Swedish banks have been criticised in Swedish media for high mortgage 
margins. According to the 36 articles (see Table 1) we have collected and studied, the 
background to this debate is as follows. In the period 2009 to 2014, the banks’ interest 
expenses - i.e. what they pay to the lend money from the Swedish Riksbank - have fallen 
significantly. However, the banks’ interest spreads - e.g. mortgage interest spreads - have not 
decreased to the same extent in the period, although it is claimed in media that this would be 
the natural thing to do by the banks.  
Mortgage interest spreads are a concern for all Swedes having a mortgage loan, which is a 
significant part of the population. That is a reason of why mortgage interest spreads is a 
particular concern for many Swedes. According to the criticism in media raised against the 
banks, it is claimed that the banks make unreasonable high profits on mortgage loans at their 
customers’ expense, thus having unreasonable high mortgage margins. Further, it has been 
expressed that the banks are not transparent enough, not presenting how they calculate their 
mortgage margins.  
The banks have stated that they have become more transparent regarding how their mortgage 
margins are calculated. However, all people do not believe that the banks really disclose their 
true mortgage margins calculations, as those calculations are complicated to make. This has 
e.g. been expressed in media by the Swedish interest group Villaägarna - a national 
organization working to promote and protect the interests of homeowners - which has 
expressed doubts on how transparent the banks really are. Villaägarna has also raised 
criticism against the four major Swedish banks in general regarding mortgage margins 
(Affärsvärlden, 2012a). Another actor who has commented on the bank’s mortgage margins 
in media is the Swedish Minister of Finance, Anders Borg, who stated that it is it is worrying 
that the banks give priority to their own profitability rather than to take social responsibility 
and contribute to stabilization (DI, 2012). 
Connecting mortgage margins to theory on accounts, we here have identified two acts/events. 
The first is the level of mortgage margins, and the second is whether the banks disclose their 
real mortgage margins. Those two acts/events are what we expect the banks to give account 
regarding. That is what we state the banks are trying to respond to in one or another way in 
the excerpts. 
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4.2.1 Swedbank 
 
Excerpt 1 
“The correlation between mortgage rates and the repo rate has decreased due to the higher 
funding costs banks have faced since the 2008 international financial crisis. Tighter new 
regulations, which Swedbank has welcomed, further increase the cost of a mortgage for both 
the bank and for customers. A debate is under way in the media on how banks set their 
lending rates and how large their margins are on mortgages, for example. A lot of attention 
has been drawn to the fact that the interest rates customers pay on their mortgages are not 
always lowered when the Riksbank cuts its repo rate. It has also been said that mortgage 
rates generally seem higher in relation to both the repo rate and the interbank rate (STIBOR) 
now than before the financial crisis. Banks’ total funding costs have increased more than the 
repo rate. […] In its report, the Riksbank confirms that the banks are not funding their 
lending at a cost that corresponds to the repo rate” (Swedbank annual report 2011, p. 14) 
Our interpretation: In excerpt 1, Swedbank gives a justification account regarding their 
level of mortgage margins. Swedbank confirms that their mortgage margins have increased in 
recent years, but that this is due to the fact that their own costs also have increased, and that 
their total funding costs have increased more than the repo rate. Further, Swedbank refers to a 
Riksbank report, which we argue is a way for them to legitimize their view of the situation, 
i.e. that their mortgage margins are not too high. It is also notable that Swedbank explicitly 
mentions media’s role in forming public opinion regarding mortgage margins. 
Excerpt 2 
“Despite Swedbank’s financial strength we, like the banking sector in general, face 
significant challenges, not least in terms of customer satisfaction. The sometimes animated 
debate on mortgage margins, cash management, pricing and profits can only mean that we 
have not succeeded in explaining the value to customers of our services. Swedish banks have 
among the most competitive banking products in the world” (Swedbank annual report 2012, 
p. 5) 
Our interpretation: Excerpt 2 is about level of mortgage margins, but is somewhat 
problematic to put into a specific group of accounts. It is partly a refocusing account, since 
Swedbank seems to want the reader to focus less on how much money he or she pays to the 
bank, and more on the service he or she gets for paying that money, mentioning that “Swedish 
banks have among the most competitive banking products in the world”. At the same time, it 
is also a justification account,  since we get the impression that Swedbank wants to convince 
the reader that e.g. their mortgage margins are reasonable, since the customers have access to 
“the most competitive banking products in the world”. Of particular interest here, we believe, 
are the words “can only mean”. With those words, Swedbank seems to want to convince the 
reader that Swedbank’s explanation is the correct one. However, there could be other 
explanations for this debate as well, we argue, e.g. that Swedbank is wrong. 
Excerpt 3 
“Since the global financial crisis in 2008, mortgage rates have not as closely followed the 
repo rate due to increased funding costs for banks. Tighter new regulations are also 
increasing the cost of mortgages for banks and their customers” (Swedbank annual report 
2012, p. 188) 
Our interpretation: In excerpt 3, Swedbank gives a justification account regarding their 
level of mortgage margins. We argue that Swedbank in this quote justifies the bank’s 
mortgage margins. The bank states that the mortgage rates repo rates have not followed the 
repo rate, leading to increased funding costs for the banks, which we argue is a way for them 
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to tell the reader that their mortgage margins are on an appropriate level. To further strengthen 
this, the bank refers new stricter regulations, although this argumentation is not further 
developed in this quote. 
Excerpt 4 
“As a product, mortgages have not been profitable for Swedish banks over long periods of 
time. This is because the net margin has been negative after factoring in expenses for 
liquidity, credit impairments, administration and tax. Mortgages have instead been used as a 
door opener to other types of business with the customer” (Swedbank annual report 2012, p. 
189) 
Our interpretation: In excerpt 4, Swedbank gives a justification account. In this quote, we as 
readers get the impression that Swedbank wants to make the reader convinced that mortgage 
margins is not a profitable business - just a door opener to other types of business. Thus, we 
as readers get the impression that Swedbank seems to want to convince the reader that their 
mortgage margins are not too high – instead perhaps too low? Notable is that it is rather 
unclear what Swedbank exactly means with the term “have not been profitable” - does 
Swedbank mean that the bank does not earn any money at all on mortgages, or just that other 
segments are more lucrative? 
Excerpt 5   
“We are convinced that improved transparency raises confidence in the banking system. In 
recent years we have gradually adapted our reporting to what the market, authorities, the 
media and credit rating agencies require in terms of transparency. One example is that we 
publish our mortgage margins on a quarterly basis” (Swedbank interim report Q2 2012, p. 2) 
Our interpretation: In excerpt 5, Swedbank gives a justification account regarding whether 
the bank discloses its real mortgage margins. As readers we get the impression that the bank 
wants to convince the reader that the bank has become more transparent, and that the bank 
indeed discloses its real mortgage margins. 
Excerpt 6 
“Since the first quarter of 2012 Swedbank has published on its website and in its annual 
report a diagram illustrating the bank's financing costs and gross margins on home loans in 
order to increase the transparency of the bank's margins on home loans. The diagram is very 
similar to the one published twice a year in the Riksbank's Financial Stability Report. 
Confirmation that the Bank's efforts to increase transparency have borne fruit came with the 
news that Swedbank had won the 2011 Ernst & Young Risk Transparency Award” (Swedbank 
sustainability report 2012, p. 27) 
Our interpretation: In excerpt 6, Swedbank gives a justification account regarding whether 
the bank discloses its real mortgage margins. In this quote, we get the impression that 
Swedbank wants to convince the reader that the bank indeed is transparent regarding their 
mortgage margins. To convince the reader about this, the banks emphasizes that they have 
won a transparency award in 2011. 
4.3 Accounts - dividends 
The four major Swedish banks have been criticised in Swedish media for their dividend 
policies. The criticism has both been about ordinary dividend payments as well as hidden 
dividend payments, i.e. repurchasing of shares. According to the 36 articles (see Table 1) we 
have collected and studied, the background to this debate is as follows. In the period 2009 to 
2014, the banks’ dividend levels have been high, and have continued to increase. For 
example, in 2013, the four major banks in total made a profit of about 67 billion SEK, where 
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almost 36 billion SEK were paid as dividends to the banks’ shareholders. Thus, almost half of 
the banks’ profits that year were paid as dividends to the shareholders (DN, 2013). 
It is not a unique thing that companies are criticized for high dividend levels. However, what 
the main critique has been about regarding the four majors Swedish banks is connected to the 
financial crisis in 2008. At that time, Swedish banks - as part of the financial sector - were 
criticized. Swedbank was in severe trouble during the financial crisis. Losses on loans 
connected to the Baltic countries threatened the bank’s status as a going concern. The bank’s 
shareholders were twice forced to inject money in order to save the bank, in total SEK 27 
billion SEK. To cover up for Swedbank and minimize the risk for bankruptcy, the Swedish 
government guaranteed repayments for some of Swedbank’s loans (DN, 2013).  
In 2008 the Swedish government increased level of payments connected to the state 
guarantee, i.e. how much money the state pays a person if this person’s bank goes bankrupt. 
In 2008, the level was raised from 100 000 SEK to 500 000 SEK. In 2010, it was once again 
raised, this time from 500 000 SEK to 100 000 EUR (Riksgälden, 2011). Since dividends 
make a bank less capitalized, that means that in case of a new financial crisis, Swedish banks 
are less capitalized than what would have been the case if the banks had been more restrictive 
regarding dividends in the time period 2009 to 2014. Thus, theoretically there is a risk the 
state will have to cover up for a bank in case of a new financial crisis, a bank that may not 
have gone bankrupt if being more restrictive with dividends. 
In order to make banks more resistant in case of future financial crises, new international 
regulations on bank capital requirements have been developed in this field in recent years, 
requirements including the Swedish banks. The financial crisis 2008 showed that the existing 
Basel II regulatory framework, regulating banks’ capital requirements, did not cover the risks 
for bankruptcies in a sufficient way. Hence, the Basel Committee started to develop a new 
comprehensive regulatory framework for banks, Basel III. The overall objective of the new 
framework is to strengthen the ability of banks to withstand losses and to reduce the 
likelihood of new financial crisis. Basel III requires banks to hold more liquid capital, and less 
other types of capital, e.g. deferred tax liabilities and goodwill (the Riksbank, 2011). In 
extension, this puts pressure on the banks to limit or at least decrease their yearly dividends, 
and instead increase the capital hold by the bank to enhance the capacity of the banks to 
withstand a potential future financial crisis.  
The four major banks’ levels of dividend payments have been criticised in media, e.g. by the 
Swedish Minister of Finance, Anders Borg. For example, in an interview with Dagens Eko 
(2011), Borg expressed that he was deeply concerned about the fact that Swedbank wanted to 
proceed with paying dividends to its shareholders, which he did not see as an appropriate 
thing to do by the bank. His critique was based on the crisis Swedbank faced during the 
financial crisis. Borg argued that Swedbank instead of paying dividends should keep profits in 
the bank, claiming it to be of major importance for all Swedish banks to be well capitalized. 
Borg explained the same opinion in Privata Affärer (2011), where he stated that his 
recommendation to Swedbank was to cancel the dividend payment plans.  
Borg has also criticized the four major Swedish banks on a more general level. In 
Affärsvärlden (2012b), he stated that the Swedish government considered to starting a 
discussion regarding increased capitalisation requirements for Swedish banks if the banks did 
not start to listen to the raised criticism regarding dividend payments (Affärsvärlden, 2012b). 
The four major Swedish banks’ dividend levels have also been criticized in media by the 
Swedish Minister for Financial Markets, Peter Norman. In DN (2013), Norman questioned the 
banks’ required rate of return, which is connected to level of dividends. He claimed that it is 
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not reasonable by the banks to expect 15 percent rate of return in times when inflation level is 
close to zero percent. Further, he - just as Anders Borg - emphasized that the government 
considered new tighter regulation in the field if the banks did not start to listen (DN, 2013). 
Connecting dividends to theory on accounts, we here have identified two acts/events, 
although they are highly related. The first is whether dividends should be paid at all, and the 
second is whether dividend levels are on an appropriate level. That is what we state the banks 
are trying to respond to in one or another way in the excerpts. 
4.3.1 Swedbank 
 
Excerpt 7 
“Swedbank comments the past day’s discussion on the bank’s repurchase of shares [...] 
Swedbank bought back shares to a value of SEK 3.5 billion during the second quarter. 
Despite this, Swedbank’s core Tier 1 ratio was 14.8 per cent at the end of the second quarter 
2011, a level placing the bank as one of the absolutely best capitalized banks in Sweden as 
well as in Europe” (Swedbank, 2011a - press release) 
Our interpretation: In excerpt 7, Swedbank gives a justification account regarding the fact 
that the bank has bought back shares, i.e. made a hidden dividend distribution. Swedbank tries 
to convince the reader that the bank’s repurchasing of shares is motivated, since the bank is 
one of the best capitalized banks in Europe, and that the repurchasing process hence is 
motivated. Of particular interest in this quote, we argue, is the word “absolutely”, according 
to our interpretation used by Swedbank to further emphasize to the reader that the 
repurchasing is justified. 
Excerpt 8 
“Given the intensified financial anxiety in Europe, the bank’s management has suggested to 
the Board that further repurchases are being halted for the time being. [...] We see today no 
altered risk in our portfolio, but the perception of our buyback program is not supporting 
Swedbank’s brand in the current market situation” (Swedbank, 2011b - press release) 
Our interpretation: In excerpt 8, Swedbank gives a justification account regarding the fact 
that the bank has bought back shares. Excerpt 8 is highly interrelated with excerpt 7, and we 
can see that Swedbank has decided to halt the repurchasing of shares. Excerpt 8 is somewhat 
ambiguous, and could be seen as both an excuse account and a justification account at the 
same time. The first sentence could be seen as an excuse account, since Swedbank seems to 
realize the inappropriateness with repurchasing shares when financial anxiety at the same time 
has intensified in Europe. However, the second sentence could be seen as a justification 
account. In this second sentence, we get the impression that Swedbank tries to say that the 
bank has done nothing wrong when repurchasing shares, but that the situation could have lead 
to Swedbank’s brand being negatively affected. 
Excerpt 9 
“Given the intensified financial anxiety in Europe and the media coverage of Swedbank’s 
share repurchase programme, the Swedbank brand was at risk of being adversely affected. As 
a result, Swedbank decided to suspend its share repurchases until further notice” (Swedbank 
interim report Q3 2011, p. 5) 
Our interpretation: Excerpt 9 is about repurchasing shares, but is somewhat blurry, we 
argue. Thus, it could be seen as a mystification account, since Swedbank’s standpoint 
regarding the repurchase programme is no longer very clear to the reader. First, Swedbank 
mentions the intensified financial anxiety and the media coverage, something that could be 
interpreted as Swedbank realizing that the bank’s way of acting has not been appropriate. 
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However, after that, Swedbank immediately mentions the risk of the bank’s brand being 
negatively affected. Here, we instead get the impression that Swedbank does not think the 
bank’s behaviour has been inappropriate. Instead, Swedbank has been forced to halt the 
repurchasing programme to not risk the that the bank’s brand being negatively affected. 
Excerpt 10 
“Swedbank’s dividend policy has been adjusted from the previous 50 per cent of profit for the 
year to 75 per cent. The new policy reflects Swedbank’s robust earning capacity and low risk, 
coupled with the fact that lending growth is expected to be limited for the foreseeable future. 
With the previous dividend level, the bank would have to continue to increase its 
capitalisation from an already high level. Even with the new policy, we will continue to build 
capital in the bank, but not as quickly. The dividend policy will be balanced in a way that 
allows Swedbank to develop long-term at the same time that capital is not unnecessarily tied 
up in the bank” (Swedbank annual report 2012, p. 12) 
Our interpretation: In excerpt 10, Swedbank gives a justification account regarding the 
bank’s new dividend policy. Here, we get the impression that Swedbank wants to convince 
the reader that it is reasonable by them to increase dividend from 50 percent of profit for the 
year to 75 percent. Swedbank mentions the low risk with the bank doing this, and through the 
whole excerpt, Swedbank emphasizes that having too much capital in the bank is of no good, 
and that distributing the capital to the shareholders is the right thing to do. In the sentence 
“with the previous dividend level, the bank would have to continue to increase its 
capitalisation from an already high level”, we get the impression that Swedbank wants to 
convince the reader that it almost would be detrimental to the bank if the dividend level would 
continue to be at 50 percent. 
Excerpt 11 
“Swedbank is one of Europe’s best capitalised banks and we are nearing capital levels where 
productivity is threatened without resilience improving. The Board of Directors’ new dividend 
policy, where 75 per cent of profit is distributed to the shareholders, gives us a good balance 
between security and efficiency. Even with the new policy Swedbank will continue to increase 
its capital base, but not as quickly as before” (Swedbank annual report 2012, p. 6) 
Our interpretation: In excerpt 11, Swedbank gives a justification account regarding the 
bank’s new dividend policy. We get the impression that Swedbank with this quote wants to 
convince the reader that 75 percent of profit distributed is an appropriate level, and that there 
is so much capital in the bank that the business would suffer if Swedbank distributed less than 
75 percent. To further legitimize the increased dividend level, the bank emphasizes that it is 
one of Europe’s best capitalized banks, and that the bank’s capital base will still continue to 
increase. For an ordinary reader, we argue it to be very hard to determine whether there really 
is a good balance between security and efficiency as Swedbank claims it to be. 
Excerpt 12 
“If we are to remain competitive in the long-term, we need to grow along with the world 
around us and in harmony with regulations and guidelines at both national and international 
levels. Our shareholders should be assured that they are investing in a secure and responsible 
bank with long-term goals. Swedbank's Return on Equity should be 15 per cent over time. 
This ROE target is commensurate with Swedbank's market position, risk profile and market 
conditions in our home markets. For the full year 2012 ROE was 14.4 per cent. Against the 
background of the bank’s stable earnings capacity and low risk, the Board has resolved to 
change Swedbank’s dividend policy to 75 per cent of profits for the year being paid as 
dividends to the bank’s shareholders, against the previous 50 per cent. Even with the new 
dividend policy, Swedbank will continue to be overcapitalised in relation to future 
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regulations. All dividends are subject to the approval of the Annual General Meeting and the 
availability of funds to allocate.” (Swedbank sustainability report 2012, p. 26) 
Our interpretation: In excerpt 12, Swedbank gives a justification account regarding the 
bank’s new dividend policy. Here, Swedbank refers to the bank’s stable Return on Equity to 
legitimize the new dividend policy. In this quote, Swedbank also emphasizes the bank’s 
awareness to of regulations regarding capitalisation. Notable here is that even though the bank 
is probably referring to a draft when mentioning “future regulations”, we find this way of 
legitimizing a dividend policy somewhat vague, since Swedbank should not be able to be that 
convinced on how regulations on capitalisation will develop in the future. However, we 
believe this is the impression Swedbank wants the reader to get. Moreover, the term “future” 
is a vague term in itself, since it could refer to both the short-, medium- and long term. 
However, what time range the term “future” refers to is not mentioned at all. 
4.3.2 Handelsbanken 
 
Excerpt 13 
”During the most recent business cycle, Handelsbanken has paid dividend to its shareholders 
every year, while remaining one of the largest payers of corporate tax in Sweden” 
(Handelsbanken annual report 2012, p. 66) 
Our interpretation: In excerpt 13, Handelsbanken could be said to give a refocusing account 
regarding the bank’s level of dividends. In this quote, the bank’s view on its dividends is not 
very clear, although we realize it is likely the bank probably finds the level of dividends 
appropriate. We believe this sentence to be of particular interest. First, dividends are 
mentioned, and immediately after that - in the very same sentence - Handelsbanken seems to 
want to make the reader to focus on the fact that the bank also is a large payer of corporate 
tax. Here, we get the impression that Handelsbanken wants to convince the reader that the 
bank’s dividend level is appropriate, and that the reader - if thinking this level is inappropriate 
- must not forget that the bank also contributes to society by paying a significant amount of 
corporate tax. We argue that the fact that Handelsbanken pays corporate tax does not 
necessarily mean high dividends are appropriate, although that is the impression we get when 
reading this quote. 
Excerpt 14 
“In 2013, Handelsbanken’s profit before taxes and government fees was just over SEK 21 
billion. This created value was distributed as follows: just over SEK 7 billion in taxes and 
government fees, just over SEK 10 billion in proposed dividends, to be paid to the 
shareholders in the spring of 2014, and the remaining approximately SEK 4 billion, which is 
reinvested in the operations” (Handelsbanken annual report 2013, p. 194) 
Our interpretation: In excerpt 14, we argue Handelsbanken gives a refocusing account, 
although we just as in excerpt 13 believe that the bank probably finds the level of dividends 
appropriate. Handelsbanken chooses to report the level of dividends - which supported by our 
findings in Swedish media could be stated to be a sensitive subject - in the very same sentence 
where the bank also emphasizes that it has paid a significant amount of corporate tax and 
government fees. Notable here is that all three mentioned categories in the quote are referred 
to as “created value”, although all readers would probably not agree on that in view of how 
media has reported about dividends.  
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4.4 Accounts - reduced manual cash handling 
The four major Swedish banks have been criticised in Swedish media for their reduced 
manual cash handling. According to the 36 articles (see Table 1) we have collected and 
studied, the background to this debate is as follows. In the period 2009 to 2014, Swedish 
banks have been criticized for reducing manual cash handling, i.e. that manual services 
connected to cash management has been reduced, being replaced by self-service applications, 
e.g. credit cards and web-based bank services. This has lead to negative opinions among some 
of the banks’ customers, not wanting all bank services to be handled by technical equipment. 
Some people argue that the banks reduce manual cash handling due to the fact that such 
services are not profitable (Riksdagen, 2013). Further, the banks have not just reduced manual 
cash handling - the cost of cash services in the banks have also increased, which e.g. was 
highlighted in an article published by SVT (2013), where it was claimed that it had become 
more expensive for retailers to handle cash transactions connected to the banks, something the 
shop owners according to SVT believed ultimately would affect the consumers (SVT, 2013).  
Swedish Quality Index - a system which collects, analyses and disseminates information on 
how customers perceive suppliers, products and services in several different contexts - 
published a report in late 2013. In it, it was stated that the Swedish bank sector continued to 
get criticised by their customers. That year, a decline in customer satisfaction could be 
observed in both private and corporate customer segments. The result of the quality index was 
the worst in many years, and in the report it was stated that the industry had a long way to go 
to increase customers’ trust. According to Swedish Quality Index, only 3 out of 10 the banks’ 
customers felt a strong confidence in the bank sector as a whole. Further, it was stated that 
one of the banking industry’s major challenges was to ensure customers’ actual needs, and 
that customers value overall service in a relationship with the bank, contrary to the fact that 
the bank services in general had declined. In the report, reduced manual cash handling was 
explicitly mentioned as something negative for customer satisfaction, along with increased 
dependence on technology services and shutdowns of physical offices. Further, it was claimed 
that the banks are criticized  by customers regarding those issues since the customers feel 
forced into the use of various technical services they not consider as functional - customers 
want safe and accurate services of their banks. Finally, it was stated the removal of cash 
handling is something many customers do not appreciate (Swedish Quality Index, 2013) 
As mentioned when studying the 36 articles (see Table 1), our impression is that Swedbank 
and Nordea have been more criticized regarding this than the other two banks. 
Connecting reduced manual cash handling to theory on accounts, we here have identified one 
act/event. This act/event is whether it is appropriate or not by the banks to reduce their manual 
cash handling. 
4.4.1 Swedbank 
 
Excerpt 15 
“Work to improve efficiencies at the branches and leave more time to meet customers was 
successful during the year. We have reduced the number of branches with manual cash 
handling. This has at times led to criticism from customers and the media, at the same time 
that we are convinced that this will allow us to offer better service in the long term.” 
(Swedbank annual report 2012, p. 22). 
Our interpretation: In excerpt 15, Swedbank gives a justification account regarding the 
bank’s reduced manual cash handling. We get the impression that Swedbank tries to convince 
the reader that the reduced manual cash handling is justified by saying it will lead to better 
service in the long term. However, it is not mentioned in what way this will lead to better 
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service. We argue that the word “convinced” is a word giving the impression that Swedbank 
has it right regarding this matter, although many customer probably would not agree on this 
statement. Notable is that Swedbank mentions the critique directed against the bank in media. 
Excerpt 16 
“Along with other banks, we have thousands of ATMs. Cash is gradually being replaced by 
card purchases. Swedbank is one of Europe's dominant card payment companies handling 
over one and a half billion card transactions each year. Reduced cash management has the 
potential to offer big savings to society. According to Riksbank estimates, handling notes and 
coins costs around SEK 11 billion per year in Sweden. By way of comparison, Handelns 
Utredningsinstitut (Swedish Institute of Retail) estimates the cost of card purchases to be 
around SEK 7 billion. Cash management also impacts the environment. Cash transport by 
Swedbank alone results in the release of over 1 000 tonnes of carbon dioxide, the equivalent 
of the carbon dioxide emissions from domestic electricity for 8 000 apartments” (Swedbank 
sustainability report 2012, p. 31) 
Our interpretation: In excerpt 16, Swedbank gives a justification account regarding the 
bank’s reduced manual cash handling. Swedbank here uses references to cash management’s 
impact on the environment to legitimize the bank’s reduced manual cash handling. Swedbank 
refers to both the Riksbank and the Swedish Institute of Retail to convince the reader that it is 
a good thing to reduce the manual cash handling in the bank. The bank further legitimizes this 
by highlighting concrete examples on how manual cash handling has negative impact on the 
environment.  
Excerpt 17 
“Three fourths of our branches in Sweden today do not handle cash, which means that we can 
create branches that are better suited for advisory services and are more efficient” 
(Swedbank interim report Q4 2012, p. 2) 
Our interpretation: In excerpt 17, Swedbank gives a justification regarding the bank’s 
reduced manual cash handling. Here, we as readers get the impression that Swedbank wants 
to convince the reader that reduced manual cash handling is a prerequisite for the bank to be 
able to put greater focus on advisory services, and to be better suited for advisory services. 
Further, we get the impression that doing all those things - i.e. handling cash, being efficient 
and improving advisory services - to a full extent is impossible for Swedbank, something that 
could be questioned thinking about the huge amount of money Swedbank pays to its 
shareholders in dividends. 
Excerpt 18 
“Technological possibilities offered by digitalisation are creating new ways to distribute 
products and services and putting consumers in a stronger position by making it easier – 
through increased transparency – to compare offers. Banks are seeing growing demand for 
digital services, especially among young customers, whose need for financial products and 
services is likely to grow as they age and their incomes grow. In addition to improvements for 
customers, digitalisation creates opportunities for banks, which can profit from efficiency 
gains e.g. as less cash is used in society. The willingness of customers to quickly adopt digital 
solutions at the same time attracts new companies, which see opportunities to compete in 
parts of the financial system. To date, the biggest pressure to change has been in consumer 
credit and payment.“ (Swedbank sustainability report 2013, p. 4) 
Our interpretation: In excerpt 18, Swedbank gives a justification regarding the bank’s 
reduced manual cash handling. We get the impression that Swedbank wants to convince the 
reader that digital solutions is the right way to go, referring to what going digital leads to in 
terms of improvements and new possibilities for customers, as well as the bank’s own 
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possibility to profit from efficiency gains when e.g. less cash is used in society. The bank also 
mentions an increased demand, especially from young customers, which we interpret as 
Swedbank saying that manual payment methods is not the future. Notable here are the words 
”the willingness of customers to quickly adopt digital solutions”, which is something that 
could be questioned due to the fact the banks indeed have been criticized in media for reduced 
manual cash handling, a fact indicating that all customers are not willing to quickly adopt new 
solutions. 
Excerpt 19 
“Customer satisfaction surveys in recent years by Swedish Quality Index show that the 
banking sector is facing a major challenge. This includes Swedbank. The bank’s customer 
satisfaction fell in 2013 in both the private and corporate markets, which shows that we have 
not listened enough to our customers. Swedbank has therefore launched several improvement 
measures to address this. Our aim is that customers will feel that we are easier to reach, 
including through improvements in cash management and the Telephone Bank and smart new 
ways to communicate by mobile phone“ (Swedbank sustainability report 2013, p. 13)  
Our interpretation: Excerpt 19 could be interpreted as Swedbank giving an excuse account 
regarding the bank’s reduced manual cash handling, although the quote also is handling 
customer satisfaction in general terms. However, Swedbank mentions “improvements in cash 
management” explicitly. The bank admits customer satisfaction has been low since the banks, 
including Swedbank, have not been listening enough to their customers. The word enough is 
what makes us identify this account as an excuse, and not a concession, since we get the 
impression that Swedbank means that the bank has not acted completely wrong. The fact that 
Swedbank mentions that the bank will try to make improvements in cash management, we 
interpret as the bank admitting that cash management indeed is important. 
4.4.2 Nordea 
 
Excerpt 20 
“The core sales staff and branch network have been adjusted to the future need with reduced 
branch locations, sharply reduced locations offering manual cash handling and reformatting 
the branch network allocation resources to advising relationship customers.” (Nordea annual 
report 2012, p. 16) 
Our interpretation: In excerpt 20, Nordea gives a justification account regarding the bank’s 
reduced manual cash handling. The reduced manual cash outlets are justified as a movement 
in line with Nordea’s strategy to meet future needs, which we interpret as Nordea trying to 
convince the reader that less manual cash handling is the future.  
Excerpt 21 
“The number of manual transactions continues to decrease and was down by 21% in 2012 
compared to 2011. Nordea accommodates this by reducing the number of manual cash 
outlets” (Nordea annual report 2012, p. 20) 
Our interpretation: In excerpt 21, Nordea gives a justification account regarding the bank’s 
reduced manual cash handling. Nordea justifies the reduced manual cash handling by 
referring to the fact that the number of manual transactions have decreased in 2012. We get 
the impression that Nordea tries to convince the reader that manual cash outlets is no longer 
as important for customers as before, and that this fact makes it justified to reduce the number 
of them. 
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Excerpt 22 
“The main drivers for keeping costs flat derive from optimisation of processes, an IT 
application landscape clean-up, continued optimization of the distribution mix, digitalisation, 
a continued reduction of manual cash handling combined with customers’ increased use of 
online banking solutions.” (Nordea annual report 2013, p. 23) 
Our interpretation: In excerpt 22, Nordea gives a justification account regarding the bank’s 
reduced manual cash handling. Our impression here is that Nordea tries to convince the reader 
that it is natural to reduce manual cash handling due to the fact that the use of online banking 
solutions increase. 
Excerpt 23 
“The vast majority of our customers visit a branch when they need advice. Otherwise, they 
prefer managing their day-to-day banking with their cards or through electronic payments. 
This is safer than using cash because: 
- it reduces the risk of individual thefts or branch robberies 
- bank cards will be replaced by Nordea if lost or stolen 
- customers will not be held responsible for transactions made with a stolen or lost card, 
other than in very rare exceptions. 
On the other hand, we recognise that cash is still the preferred option for many of our older 
customers. Over half of our branches still offer cash withdrawal service over the counter.“ 
(Nordea sustainability report 2012, p. 16) 
Our interpretation: In excerpt 23, Nordea gives a justification account regarding the bank’s 
reduced manual cash handling. Nordea justifies its reduced manual cash handling by stating 
that most customers use electronic payments. Of particular interest is the term “vast majority” 
Nordea uses to express this, a term which however is not further explained in more precise 
terms. It is difficult for us as readers to determine how many percent of a company’s 
customers “a vast majority” is. Further, we get the impression that Nordea wants to convince 
the reader that it is natural for the bank to reduce manual cash handling since most of the 
customers do not need the service, and that Nordea thus knows what the bank’s customers 
want, i.e. more digital solutions and less manual solutions. It is also notable that Nordea 
emphasizes the risks of using cash by explicitly mentioning the risk of individual thefts or 
branch robberies, and further emphasizes the advantages with using cards. We also get the 
impression that Nordea tries to hedge itself in the end of excerpt 23, where the bank states that 
it to a large extent still offers manual cash handling. 
4.5 Accounts - high levels of remuneration 
The four major Swedish banks have been criticised in Swedish media for their high levels of 
remuneration. According to the 36 articles (see Table 1) we have collected and studied, the 
background to this debate is as follows. In the period 2009 to 2014, the four major Swedish 
banks levels of remuneration have been criticized, i.e. level of compensation to executives 
and other employees. The main question in this debate is whether bonuses and high salaries in 
general, and for executives and board members in particular, are motivated, and if it really 
leads to a more well-performing bank. In the end, it is the customers who pay for those 
salaries and bonuses. 
In SvD (2010), where it was revealed that SEB aimed to pay more money on bonuses than the 
bank’s entire annual profit, the Swedish Minister of Finance - Anders Borg - stated that he 
had the intention to consider new tighter remuneration regulations, unless the banks did not 
start to consider the inappropriateness of their bonuses. Borg further stated that the public can 
and will not accept this type of behaviour, and that the banks should consider the fact that 
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they need the public to make their profits. In SvD (2010), the professor of economics - Carl B. 
Hamilton - stated that the he believed the banks’ bonuses being too short-term. Hamilton 
stated that bonuses should not be based on only a single year’s result. Instead, they must be 
based on sustainable achievements in a longer period of time. Further, Hamilton argued that 
unless such changes are not made by the banks, likely consequences for them will be that the 
government will limit the banks’ possibilities to pay too high bonuses. Further, in SVT 
(2010), the Swedish Minister for Financial Markets - Mats Odell - stated that he at the general 
meeting in Nordea had tried to limit future bonus payments to the CEO and the Executive 
Management, but that he had failed. Further, Odell stated that he would not give up in trying 
to make this a reality, and that there is no evidence that directors who receive bonuses do a 
better job than directors who do not receive bonuses. Rather, Odell claimed that there is much 
research indicating that high bonuses lead to short-termism and high risk-taking. 
Connecting high levels of remuneration to theory on accounts, we here have identified one 
act/event. This act/event is whether the banks’ levels of remuneration are appropriate or not. 
4.5.1 Swedbank 
 
Excerpt 24 
“2011 saw major swings in the global economy. The year began with strong confidence in the 
recovery, especially in Sweden. Then the European debt crisis struck during the summer and 
greatly impacted growth prospects. As the year went along, the crisis was felt increasingly by 
the average business and household. At the same time the entire banking system came under 
growing criticism for its speculative practices, excessive remuneration and benefit to the 
economy. Although the criticism was warranted in some respects, the debt crisis and its 
consequences are just as much tied to economic policy in individual countries” (Swedbank 
annual report 2011, p. 4) 
Our interpretation: In excerpt 24, Swedbank gives an excuse account regarding the bank’s 
excessive remuneration. The bank admits that it has not acted in the most responsible manner 
regarding e.g. levels of remuneration. However, the bank does not fully take the blame. 
Instead, Swedbank claims that the criticism just as much is linked to factors the bank cannot 
affect, which in this specific case according to Swedbank is economic policy in individual 
countries. However, it is unclear whether the second sentence refers to all mentioned areas of 
criticism, or just a few. 
4.5.2 SEB 
 
Excerpt 25 
“SEB too had an exceptional year in many ways in 2009. The Bank had to deal with [...] 
criticism from customers, shareholders and politicians of the Bank’s remuneration system. A 
goal-oriented remuneration system is vital. The Board’s assessment is that a mix of fixed and 
variable remuneration is an instrument for creating long-term customer and shareholder 
value. Our experience is that a goal oriented compensation system is a powerful tool in a 
company as it encourages behaviours that promote sound risk management and stellar 
performance. Having variable remuneration as part of the mix, contributes to a lower cost 
base as well as an overall remuneration level that mirrors the bank’s profitability. This was 
obvious a year as 2009 when the proportion of variable remuneration to overall staff costs 
fell sharply” (SEB annual report 2009, p. 2) 
Our interpretation: In excerpt 25, SEB gives a justification account regarding the bank’s 
remuneration system. The bank explicitly mentions criticism raised against the bank’s 
remuneration system, and then dismisses this criticism. Of particular interest here, we argue, 
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are the expressions “our experience is that”, “a powerful tool” and “this was obvious”. We get 
the impression that those specific terms and words are used by SEB to convince the reader 
that the bank itself is the actor with most expertise to determine what remuneration system it 
is most appropriate to use - not other actors. Further, the bank justifies the remuneration 
system by stating that it leads to creation of shareholder value and a lowered cost base. 
Excerpt 26 
“SEB believes in a sound and dynamic performance culture that spurs achievements, a 
desired behaviour and balanced risk-taking, in line with customers’ and shareholders’ 
expectations. SEB‘s remuneration structure is designed to encourage both short-term results 
and long-term strategic decisions in order to support good business results over time. It is 
also designed to support sound risk management by taking the cost of the capital and liquidity 
into account. The composition and size of the remuneration is based on business logic, market 
practice, competitive situation and the employees’ competence. Properly designed 
remuneration systems help SEB to attract, retain and motivate employees with the right 
competence, who will contribute to the long-term success of the Bank. SEB actively promotes 
equal pay for men and women and continuously evaluates the effects of the remuneration 
structure and its competitiveness” (SEB annual report 2009, p. 14) 
Our interpretation: In excerpt 26, SEB gives a justification account regarding the bank’s 
remuneration system. SEB justifies its remuneration system by mentioning all its advantages. 
No disadvantages are mentioned at all. Here, we get the impression that SEB tries to convince 
the reader it is necessary to use the remuneration system the bank does to be able to attract 
and motivate employees, leading to a situation where the bank is able to achieve satisfactory 
results. Notable here are that SEB further motivates its remuneration system by saying the 
bank does this due to “business logic”, “market practice” and “competitive situation”. This 
further strengthens our impression that SEB wants to convince the reader that it is necessary 
to use the remuneration system the bank does, and that another remuneration strategy would 
not be preferable. 
Excerpt 27 
“The ambition of the Board is to create a remuneration system that attracts, motivates and 
retains skilled employees. Remuneration should be competitive in the markets and segments 
where SEB operates in order to motivate high performing employees. The Bank’s competitors 
consist of other Swedish and Nordic banks as well as certain global firms. As more than half 
of SEB’s income is attributable to business with large companies and financial institutions, 
the remuneration model within these business areas needs to reflect the international market 
in which the Bank competes. In other words, the remuneration model has been adapted to 
individual competences, each respective business line and country of operation. Excellent 
business performance shall be established by combining great individual performance and 
balanced risk taking. Remuneration shall be built for encouraging short-term results as well 
as long-term strategic decisions needed to ensure a sustained business performance over 
time. It shall reflect sound risk management by taking into account the cost of capital 
employed and liquidity required.” (SEB annual report 2009, p. 25) 
 
Our interpretation: In excerpt 27, SEB gives a justification account regarding the bank’s 
remuneration system. Just as in excerpt 26, SEB emphasizes the bank’s need of attracting and 
motivating employees. Here, we get the intention that SEB wants to convince the reader that 
the remuneration system is crucial for succeeding in recruiting the right employees. Through 
the excerpt, a lot of other motives for the selected remuneration system are given to the reader 
as well. Some of those motives are not every specific - it is not easy for us as readers to 
understand exactly what all sentences mean in practice. However, one other main argument 
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SEB seems to want to convince the reader about is that since the market in general uses the 
remuneration strategy in question, SEB must use it as well to stay competitive in the market. 
 
4.6 Identified accounts - a summary 
 
Table 2 – Identified accounts 
As the table shows, we have in total identified 27 accounts in the banks’ accounting narratives 
in the time period 2009 to 2014. The vast majority of those accounts - 21 in total – have been 
justifications. We found accounts regarding all areas of criticism. The fact that we found so 
many justifications is in line with Aerts’ (1994: 337) finding that accounting narratives are 
“defensive in nature”, and indicates that the banks do not want to change actual behaviour to 
maintain legitimate, but rather try to affect readers’ perceptions in line with Dowling and 
Pfeffer (1975) and Lindblom (1993). Swedbank is clearly overrepresented in number of 
accounts - 18 accounts were identified in Swedbank, and accounts were given by Swedbank 
regarding all areas of criticism. In the other banks we just found 10 accounts in total. 2 
accounts were identified in Handelsbanken regarding dividends, 4 accounts in Nordea 
regarding reduced manual cash handling and 3 accounts in SEB regarding levels of 
remuneration. 
The reason of why we found so many accounts in Swedbank in particular, we cannot say 
anything about for sure. We could not find anything in the 139 articles we have studied 
indicating that Swedbank has been target of criticism to a much higher extent than any other 
of the four major Swedish banks. However, one possible reason could be Swedbank’s failure 
during the financial crisis mentioned in part 4.3. In line with Legitimacy theory, this failure 
may have led to a situation where the bank has chosen to become more transparent and to use 
disclosures as a way to respond to criticism, thus trying to decrease the risk of not being seen 
as a legitimate actor in society. However, of that we have no evidence for sure. Another 
possible explanation could be that Swedbank in some regards finds the criticism justified to a 
higher extent than what the other banks find it, thus finding it necessary to respond to the 
criticism by giving accounts. 
Another interesting remark is that, as we stated, we got the impression when collecting and 
reading the articles regarding reduced manual cash handling that Swedbank and Nordea had 
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been more criticized for this than the other two banks. Supporting this impression is the fact 
that reduced manual cash handling was the only area of criticism where we identified 
accounts in Nordea - 4 accounts in total.  
Yet another interesting remark is that we, as stated, got the impression when collecting and 
reading the articles that Handelsbanken seldom was explicitly mentioned by name in the 
articles. Rather, Handelsbanken was more often included just when the articles refer to “the 
four major Swedish banks”. Thus, it is not illogical that less number of accounts was found in 
Handelsbanken, although we did not find that many accounts in SEB or Nordea as well. None 
of Handelsbanken’s accounts were justification accounts. 
Notable is that we found most accounts in 2011 and 2012. However, since we just have been 
able to present a general picture of the raised media criticism in the time period 2009 to 2014, 
the exact years we have found accounts in is not something we can analyse further - we can 
just try to discern tendencies of the whole time period.  
Further, notable is also that the most common disclosure vehicle used to give accounts by the 
banks was the annual report. 
4.7 The connection between the media articles and the identified accounts 
We have now analysed the collected 139 web-based media articles - articles in six important 
Swedish media actors - and their content regarding mortgage margins, dividends, reduced 
manual cash handling and levels of remuneration in the time period 2009 to 2014. By 
studying them, we could state that there had been criticism directed against the four major 
Swedish banks regarding those areas of criticism in the time period 2009 to 2014. Further, we 
have identified 27 accounts regarding those areas of criticism in the banks’ accounting 
narratives in the same period. We cannot prove that there is a connection between the media 
articles and all the identified accounts. We have not been able to be so precise in time when 
collecting the articles that we for sure could state that a certain account is linked to some 
specific articles. Rather, our data collection indicates that the pressure has been quite general 
during the whole period. However, we found explicit evidence of that some accounts is a 
direct response to media attention. Media was explicitly mentioned in four excerpts - in 
excerpt number 1, 5, 9 and 15. Further, since excerpt 7 and 8 referred to the same event as 
excerpt 9, it indicates that media attention was related to those accounts too. All those 
excerpts consisted of accounts given by Swedbank  - excerpt 1 and 5 were related to mortgage 
margins, excerpt 9 to dividends and excerpt 15 to reduced manual cash handling. Further, we 
found some other excerpts not mentioning media’s role explicitly, but referring to 
circumstances that implicitly could be connected to media. In excerpt 2, Swedbank mentioned 
an “animated debate” regarding mortgage margins, and in excerpt 24, SEB mentioned that 
“the entire banking system came under growing criticism for its speculative practices”, e.g. 
their remuneration systems, and that the banks had to deal with “criticism from customers, 
shareholders and politicians”. Thus, it is likely that Swedbank in both those excerpts 
implicitly refers to media - after all, media is a communication channel for “customers, 
shareholders and politicians”.  
Something that further strengthens the likelihood of that more than just the excerpts explicitly 
or implicitly referring to media is a response to the media attention, is the fact that we have 
not studied all Swedish media actors, and have not even tried to find every single article 
regarding the areas of criticism from the media actors we have selected. Still, we have been 
able to demonstrate a major negative media attention. Thus, it is most likely that the media 
attention has been even more intense than what our table shows. Further, the theory presented 
in the theoretical framework on media as a powerful stakeholder in society and Legitimacy 
theory has demonstrated that media is a powerful actor in society. If media gives the banks 
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negative attention, that could threaten the banks’ legitimacy, which in turn could threaten the 
banks’ profitability. This negative attention is not just a threat for a bank as a whole, but also 
for the executives in particular. Thus, this shows that the banks have several incentives to 
respond to the criticism, although we realize there are more ways of doing that than just using 
the disclosure vehicles we have studied. 
To sum up, we believe us to have found enough evidence to state that accounts in the four 
major banks’ accounting narratives responding to criticism raised in Swedish media regarding 
mortgage margins, dividends, reduced manual cash handling and levels of remuneration exist. 
We can definitely state that is the case in Swedbank. Further, it is likely to be the case also in 
Nordea, Handelsbanken and SEB, although we cannot state that for sure. 
4.8 Media, the banks, legitimacy, accounts and impression management - the connection 
between them 
Are the accounts we have identified a possible impression management tool? We argue they 
are. By studying and interpreting the 27 accounts we have identified, we have demonstrated 
many examples of how the banks use words and sentences to demonstrate that their opinion is 
the correct opinion. In many of the excerpts, the text has the ability to affect the reader’s 
perceptions, we argue, thus guiding the reader towards a particular interpretation of the 
act/event. This could in turn lead to a situation where the reader adopts the banks’ opinion. 
We cannot prove that this is a deliberate strategy used by the banks, even though it is not 
unlikely. However, our identified accounts could be stated to be “linguistic devices employed 
when an outcome, action or decision is assessed by stakeholders of a company” in line with 
Sandell and Svensson’s (2012: 4) definition of accounts. Further, we believe us to have 
enough evidence to say that the accounts we have identified could be a “conscious or 
unconscious attempt to control images that are projected in real or imagined social 
interactions” in line with Clow and Kenneth’s (2005: 93) definition of impression 
management. Hence, we argue that giving accounts could be used as an impression 
management strategy. 
Now, it is time to link the thesis’ different parts together - including both theory, empirics and 
analysis - summarizing what we have tried to demonstrate in our thesis. Although we have 
only found a definite connection between accounts and media reporting in Swedbank, the 
example includes all the banks. We realize the example is a simplification of reality, and that 
media is not the only powerful actor the company has to take into consideration. However, for 
summing up our findings, we believe the example to be appropriate. This is our interpretation 
of what we have studied. 
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In the figure, we can see that criticism is raised against the banks in media. Since media is an 
important actor and a strong opinion maker, this negative attention may lead to a situation 
where people in society - including many of the banks’ important stakeholders - may be 
affected by this media reporting. This may in turn create a legitimacy gap. This legitimacy 
gap threatens the banks’ legitimacy, and thus e.g. the banks’ profitability and reputation. The 
legitimacy gap is not just a threat to the bank in general - it is also a threat to the executives on 
an individual level. Hence, the banks want to reduce or close the legitimacy gap. However, 
the banks do not want to change actual behaviour. Thus, the banks instead try to affect 
people’s perceptions regarding the topic the bank has been criticized for. To do this, the banks 
use their disclosure vehicles. In their disclosure vehicles, the banks publish an accounting 
narrative where they give an account regarding the area of criticism. In this given account, 
words and sentences are used in a way that may affect the reader’s perception, thus being a 
type of impression management. If the reader’s perceptions are affected, the reader might 
change opinion and agree with the bank’s opinion. Thus, the legitimacy gap is reduced, and if 
the account affects enough readers’ perceptions, it may be completely closed. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
5.1 Answer to the purpose of the thesis 
The purpose of this thesis has been to examine whether accounts have been given by the four 
major Swedish banks - Swedbank, Handelsbanken, Nordea and SEB - in their accounting 
narratives as a response to negative media attention in the time period 2009 to 2014, and 
whether those accounts could be seen as an impression management tool. 
In this thesis, we have demonstrated that accounts have been given by the four major Swedish 
banks in their accounting narratives to respond to negative media attention in the time period 
2009 to 2014. By studying the extent and the content of six important Swedish media actors’ 
negative reporting on the four major Swedish banks’ high mortgage margins, high dividends, 
high levels of remuneration and reduced manual cash handling, we have been able to identify 
27 accounts in the banks’ accounting narratives connected to high mortgage margins, high 
dividends, high levels of remuneration and reduced manual cash handling. In Swedbank, we 
could for certain link 4 identified accounts to the media attention. Further, 4 more accounts 
could implicitly be linked to media attention - 3 in Swedbank and 1 in SEB. The other 19 
identified accounts we could not for certain link to the media attention, although it is likely 
that some or many of them were also a direct response to the media attention, since those 
accounts were connected to the areas of criticism media to a high extent had been reporting 
about. Most identified accounts were justifications. Swedbank was highly over-represented 
among the banks regarding number of given accounts. Due to the fact that we have found 
accounts linked to media reporting, that is evidence of that media is a stakeholder important 
for the banks to take into consideration. 
The accounts we have identified in the banks’ accounting narratives are in line with Sandell 
and Svensson’s (2012: 4) definition of accounts, i.e. “linguistic devices employed when an 
outcome, action or decision is assessed by stakeholders of a company”. Further, we have 
demonstrated that the accounts we have identified could be a “conscious or unconscious 
attempt to control images that are projected in real or imagined social interactions” in line 
with Clow and Kenneth’s (2005: 93) definition of impression management. Based on our 
findings, we hence argue that the identified accounts could be seen as an impression 
management tool. We have demonstrated that in many of the accounting narratives where the 
accounts have been identified, a narrative reader’s perceptions could be affected by the 
accounts, possibly making the reader adopt the banks’ opinion. However, we cannot prove 
this is a deliberate strategy used by the banks. 
Accounts are a possible impression management tool the banks can use to handle negative 
media attention. Negative media attention may create a legitimacy gap if the public adopts the 
negative picture drawn up by media and see the banks behaviour as inappropriate. This 
threatens the banks’ legitimacy. Using accounts in accounting narratives in different types of 
disclosure vehicles is a possible impression management strategy the banks then can use to 
affect people’s perceptions regarding the banks’ behaviour. If successful, people may adopt 
the banks’ point of view, and hence accounts are a way for the banks to reduce or close a 
legitimacy gap. 
5.2 The contribution of our research in a broader perspective 
After now having presented our conclusions, we would like to clarify what we consider as 
being the main contributions of this thesis in a broader perspective. In line with Hines (1988), 
our findings support the fact that financial reports could not be stated as something 
completely neutral and objective. Rather, we have found evidence of that accounting 
narratives may affect a reader’s perceptions regarding certain company-related matters, and 
that accounts in accounting narratives hence could be seen as an impression management tool. 
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However, our focus has not just been on financial reports, i.e. annual reports and interim 
reports. We have also demonstrated that accounting narratives in other alternative company 
disclosure vehicles, e.g. sustainability reports and press releases, could be used for impression 
management purposes as well, something  prior research according to Brennan and Merkl-
Davies (2013: 30) to a limited extent has focused on.  
Even though our focus has not been on whether the examined banks’ accounting narratives 
are truthful or not, we argue that the very existence of impression management in accounting 
narratives increase the risk of them not being objective, something that is in line with Jones 
(1996). Further, even though our focus has not been on which type of accounts the examined 
banks use when they give an account, we find it necessary to mention a few things regarding 
this as well. Although we have identified too few accounts in the examined banks’ accounting 
narratives to be able to say anything for sure, and further that there may exist accounts 
regarding other topics in the banks accounting narratives we have not examined, justification 
was the most common type of account identified. This is in line with Aerts’ (1994: 337) 
finding that accounting narratives are “defensive in nature”. Further, we have shown that 
accounting narratives are not just used by companies to give accounts regarding poor financial 
performance, as demonstrated by Sandell and Svensson (2012). Accounts are also used by 
well-performing companies in their accounting narratives to respond to negative media 
attention.  
We have also found a link proving that media attention is the reason of at least a few of the 
identified accounts. Thus, our thesis has contributed to theory on media as a powerful 
stakeholder. We have demonstrated that media is a stakeholder that affects companies, since it 
is a stakeholder whose negative attention has the ability to create legitimacy gaps. This in turn 
indicates that negative media attention can be a threat to a company’s legitimacy, which is in 
line with e.g. Ashforth and Gibbs (1990), Hybels (1995), Johnson and Holub (2003) and 
Palazzo and Scherer (2006), and gives an explanation to why the banks make voluntary 
disclosures regarding those matters. Our findings indicate that giving accounts in accounting 
narratives is a possible impression management strategy companies may use to trying to close 
or at least reducing legitimacy gaps arisen due to negative media attention. 
So, what do accounting narratives really do with a person’s mind? To that question, there is 
no simple answer. Just as Rutherford (2003: 373) states, it can be discussed how effective 
impression management strategies really are, i.e. whether “sophisticated preparers would 
expect users to respond naively to efforts to manage impressions”. In line with this, we cannot 
for sure say what the accounts we have identified really do with readers’ perceptions. 
However, that has not been the main point with writing this thesis. Neither is it important 
whether a reader of the thesis agree with all our interpretations of the identified accounts - 
since those are our own interpretations, it is natural if they are questioned. However, such 
critical thinking is exactly what we have intended to achieve with this thesis - i.e. that people 
start to think about not just what they read, but also what hidden intentions an accounting 
narrative preparer might have. Accounting narratives and other accounting information is of 
good, we argue, but it is not something that per definition should be seen as an objective truth. 
It is good to question things - both when reading texts and in life in general. Otherwise, it is 
easy to be fooled. Thus, let us finish with a few words by Hines (1988: 254), directed to the 
reader of this thesis: “Do you see? Are you beginning to see?”.  
5.3 Suggestions for future research 
We would like to give some suggestions for future research in our research field, since our 
findings have led to new questions. First of all, we believe it would be of interest to further 
examine the reason of why so many accounts were identified in Swedbank. As we speculated 
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a bit about in the analysis, some of the explanation could perhaps be connected to the fact that 
Swedbank was close to bankruptcy during the financial crisis in 2008. A researcher could try 
to compare general disclosure tendencies in Swedbank before and after the financial crisis, 
and see if there are any differences. Another possible reason of differences in number of 
accounts could perhaps be explained if studying the four major Swedish banks’ ownership 
structures and type of customer clienteles, and see what differences there might be.  
Further, researchers could try to discern tendencies of when a company uses what disclosure 
vehicle to give an account, and if one type of account is more often given in a certain type of 
disclosure vehicle. The numbers of accounts we have identified are too small to be able to 
determine that. However, if choosing a larger sample, perhaps it would be possible to discern 
such tendencies. Further, it would be interesting to try to find an explanation to why a 
company chooses to give a specific type of account - could that perhaps be connected to what 
type of legitimacy gap that has arisen? 
Finally, it would be interesting to examine if the banks responses differ depending on which 
type of stakeholder that has expressed criticism in media. 
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